

# MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE



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Hindu minority villagers camp on mud banks near their submerged homes in Badin district, Sindh, Pakistan (Sept 2011). © IOM 2011 - MPK0609 (Photo: Chris Lom)

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# Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko<sup>1</sup>

Welcome to the second issue of *Migration Policy Practice*. The focus of this edition is on Migration and Public Opinion, and on ways to survey potential migrants worldwide about their future migration plans. This special theme is informed by three articles by Gallup, Ipsos and IOM which give account of the latest methodologies and findings in this important area of research.

The article by Gallup (*Neli Esipova, Julie Ray and Dr Anita Pugliese*) offers an introduction to the body of Gallup's ongoing global migration research, which includes questions such as: residents' desire to move to other countries permanently or temporarily for work or study; residents' active plans and preparations to move to another country; attitudes towards migrants in receiving countries; and migrant integration. The article informs of Gallup's sampling and data collection methodology as well as the most recent survey findings under each research question.

The article by Ipsos (*Keren Gottfried*) discusses the latest findings of Ipsos' survey on Global Views on Immigration, which analyses attitudes towards immigration in 23 countries on a monthly basis. The article shows that a strong majority of citizens (80%) are of the opinion that "over the last five years, the amount of migrants in their country has increased", while nearly one half (45%) believe that "immigration has generally had a negative impact on their country". Half believe that immigrants "have made it more difficult for their country's nationals to get jobs" and that "they are placing too much pressure on their country's public service".

The last article on Migration and Public Opinion, by IOM (*Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko*), discusses some of the key findings of IOM's *World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration*, which was published in December 2011 in celebration of IOM's sixtieth anniversary. The article discusses, in particular, current perceptions about migrants and migration, as

well the ways in which the media can shape attitudes about migration. The article also highlights several examples of good practice among governments, civil society, international organizations and the media which have actively worked towards communicating effectively about migration.

In addition to the special focus on Public Opinion, this issue also includes two articles on Migration and Climate Change, and on the preparation and use of Migration Profiles. The article by Richard Black and Stephen Bennett discusses some of the key findings of the recent Foresight report, *Migration and Global Environmental Change*, which was published by the UK Government Office for Science in December 2011. The article argues, in particular, that the challenge for policymakers is to ensure that migration is one of a series of options for adaptation to environmental change, *before* such change has major negative effects on peoples' livelihoods and well-being. The article also suggests that policies that embrace the potential of migration to contribute to long-term resilience, in the right circumstances, are more strategic in their approach to the climate-migration issue.

The last article, by Marina Manke, Frank Laczko and Rudolf Anich, discusses some of the key guiding principles for the preparation of Migration Profiles. The article explains, in particular, how international partners can provide technical guidance and support to governments wishing to prepare a country migration profile. The article also shows that while there are now many different kinds of documents which are labelled as Migration Profiles, there remains a lack of a common understanding of what a Migration Profile is and how the process can contribute to policy development.

We hope you enjoy this issue of *Migration Policy Practice* and we look forward to your comments, suggestions and possible articles for future editions of the journal.

<sup>1</sup> Solon Ardittis is Managing Director of Eurasyllum Ltd and Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOM Headquarters in Geneva. They are co-editors of *Migration Policy Practice*.

# Gallup World Poll: global desire, plans and preparation to migrate

Neli Esipova, Julie Ray and Dr Anita Pugliese<sup>1</sup>

Gallup conducts annual World Poll surveys in countries that represent more than 98 per cent of the world's adult population. Our surveys cover topics from basic needs to job creation. Our database currently includes more than 750,000 interviews collected in more than 150 countries, regions and territories since 2005.

Gallup asks a standard core set of questions in its worldwide surveys. These questions assess attitudes on migration, jobs, health, safety, governance, infrastructure, education, the environment, entrepreneurship, social networks, civic engagement, well-being and more. We also ask region-specific items. Only Gallup regularly collects comparable employment and household income data worldwide.

This article is an introduction to the body of Gallup's ongoing global migration research. Our questions about migration assess the following:

- residents' desire to move to other countries permanently or temporarily for work or study;
- residents' active plans and preparations to move to another country;
- labour migration flows and destinations for temporary workers;
- social networks;
- remittances;
- attitudes toward migrants in receiving countries;
- migrant integration;
- the environment and migration;
- internal migration.

## Sampling and data collection methodology

With some exceptions, all samples are probability based and nationally representative of residents aged 15 and older. Gallup's coverage area includes entire countries, including rural areas. The typical survey includes either telephone or face-to-face interviews with at least 1,000 adults. The sample size is between 500 and 1,000 in rare instances. Gallup collects oversamples in major cities or regions of special interest in some countries.

Gallup conducts telephone surveys in countries where telephone coverage represents at least 80 per cent of the population or is the customary survey methodology. In these countries, we use random-digit-dial (RDD) or

a nationally representative list of phone numbers. We use a dual sampling frame in select countries where cell phone penetration is high. In the rest of the world, Gallup conducts interviews face to face and uses an area frame design.

Gallup applies standardized survey methodology worldwide, making it possible to compare results across all countries and over time. We can also monitor trends, identify global and regional patterns, and aggregate data across multiple years to increase statistical power in situations that require complex analysis. The wealth of topics that Gallup's World Poll covers lets us study these situations from multiple angles.


## Migration desires, plans and preparation

Hundreds of millions of adults worldwide would leave their homelands if they could and start new lives somewhere else. But many of these people may never actually leave. In some situations, their home countries may not allow them to go or their personal circumstances, such as their health, finances or family obligations, may keep them home. And yet, millions still plan to go and are preparing to leave.

Gallup studies follow hundreds of thousands of potential migrants worldwide from where the dream begins – with their desire to move to another country – to where it becomes more real. Our data reveal wide gulfs between those who desire to move permanently, those who are planning to move in the next 12 months, and those who are actively preparing to move. Fourteen per cent of the world's adults say they would like to move, 8 per cent of them are planning to do so in the next year, and less than half of those planning to move say they have already started making preparations.

Figure 1:

Global desire for permanent migration vs. plan vs. preparation  
Projected to adults aged 15+ across 146 countries



<sup>1</sup> Neli Esipova is Global Migration Research Director at Gallup; Julie Ray is a writer and analyst at Gallup; and Dr Anita Pugliese is Research and Quality Director at Gallup.

These potential migrants' profiles look different at each point on the path to permanent migration, which is vital intelligence for leaders who are seeking to formulate and implement coherent migration and development policies. By studying the transformation that takes place among those who would like to go, those who plan to go and those who are getting ready to go, we gain a better understanding of not only who, but also the dynamics of why.

The Gallup data are unique in that they reflect potential migrants' situations and mindsets before they take their next step. These data are instrumental in helping leaders think proactively rather than reactively about how migration can benefit their communities, organizations and countries.

### **Migration desire**

Gallup's global database makes it possible to estimate the number of adults who would like to migrate permanently to another country if they could, pinpoint who these prospective migrants are – their education, gender, age, employment status and other characteristics – and identify the dynamics of their desire to leave. These data also provide clues as to where the next wave of potential migrants might come from and where they might go – crucial information for policymakers and other government and civil society groups in migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries alike.

Gallup's latest World Poll findings, based on interviews with 401,490 adults in 146 countries – which represent more than 93 per cent of the world's adult population – indicate that worldwide desire to migrate permanently to another country showed signs of cooling between 2007 and 2010.

However, hundreds of millions of adults would still like to move: Fourteen per cent of the world's adults – or about 630 million people – would like to migrate to another country if they had the chance, down from 16 per cent, or more than 700 million people, in previous years. These figures are still at least triple the 214 million international migrants the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated worldwide in 2010 – and this 214 million includes children and adults (United Nations, 2009).

### **Where the next wave of potential migrants might come from**

Residents in sub-Saharan Africa remain the most likely worldwide to express a desire to migrate permanently, Gallup finds. Thirty-three per cent of adults across sub-Saharan Africa say they would like to move, although this is down from 38 per cent in earlier readings. Desire also faded slightly in Latin America (from 23% to 20%) and in South-East Asia (from 12% to 9%) between 2007 and 2010.

In other parts of the world, desire remained unchanged. In the European Union, for example, the percentage of adults who would like to migrate permanently was unmoved at 20 per cent. In Northern America, which includes the United States of America and Canada, the percentage of potential migrants held at 10 per cent.

### **Where they might go**

Eighteen countries attract more than 70 per cent of potential migrants worldwide. The United States continues to be the top desired destination for adults who would like to migrate. About 23 per cent of potential migrants – about 145 million adults worldwide – name the United States as their desired future residence. Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Australia appeal to at least 25 million adults.

Northern America and countries in the European Union continue to be top draws regionally. Roughly 188 million adults, or about 30 per cent of the total percentage of adults who would like to move worldwide, would like to move to Northern America.

About 178 million adults would like to move to a country in the European Union. Additionally, the European Union has the highest percentage of residents worldwide who would like to move there from within the union. Of 178 million who would like to move to a European Union country, about 36 million are from within the European Union.

### **What would happen if all potential migrants moved today**

Gallup's Net Migration indexes suggest that if everyone who would like to migrate moved where he or she wanted, many developed countries could be overwhelmed, and developing nations could lose valuable human capital. Some wealthy nations could see their adult populations double or even triple. Others that can ill afford to see their populations decline, such as the Russian Federation, stand to lose big.

Potential Net Migration Index scores are the estimated numbers of adults who would like to move permanently out of a country if the opportunity arose, subtracted from the estimated numbers of adults who would like to move into it, as a proportion of the total adult population. The higher the resulting positive Potential Net Migration Index value, the larger the potential net adult population gain.

For example, subtracting the estimated 15 million Russian adults who would like to move out of the Russian Federation if they had the opportunity from the 7 million adults who would like to move to the Russian Federation and dividing that number by the total Russian adult population (121 million) results in a Potential

Net Migration Index value – or a net adult population loss – of -7 per cent.

Gallup's Potential Net Brain Gain and Potential Net Youth Migration indexes, calculated using a similar approach to that of the Potential Net Migration Index, measure the potential net change to the adult population with the equivalent of a bachelor's degree or higher and the net change to the 15- to 29-year-old population, respectively.

Index scores worldwide indicate that highly developed countries generally would see a much larger influx of young people than they would educated people. Only developed Asia would see significant brain drain.

Developing nations, in contrast, could potentially experience losses in every area – particularly among youth. Latin America, for example, could see similar losses in its total adult population and its most educated population, but losses among youth could be significant. India, in particular, could potentially face brain drain: the country's Potential Net Brain Gain Index (-12%) is significantly lower than its Potential Net Migration Index (-5%).

### The demographics of desire

#### *Job status matters, although not for everyone*

People's intrinsic need for a good job is evident among those who say they would like to migrate. Underemployed<sup>2</sup> adults in many parts of the world are often the most likely to say they would like to move to another country permanently if given the chance. Worldwide, underemployed adults are nearly twice as likely (20%) as those employed at capacity (13%) or not in the workforce (11%) to say they would like to migrate.

#### Engagement at work does not necessarily dim desire to migrate

Given the relationship between underemployment and the desire to migrate, one would think that workers who have formed a positive emotional attachment to their workplaces would be less likely to want to move away from them. Gallup's data confirm this hypothesis – but only in some parts of the world.

In South Asia and South-East Asia, workers who are engaged at work are more likely to say they would like

to migrate permanently to another country. Education alone does not help explain this difference. Greater aspirations and optimism about the future combined with better perceived opportunities for themselves and their families could explain this seeming anomaly.

#### *Case in point: India*

India's Potential Net Brain Gain Index (-12%) is significantly lower than its Potential Net Migration Index (-5%). This suggests that educated people do have a greater desire to leave the country. More compelling is the notion that those who are engaged at work or those who intend to start a business in the next 12 months have a greater desire to leave the country than others do.

Engagement at work for many Indians does not appear to preclude their aspirations to settle overseas. It is possible that Indians can be engaged at work and still view their career options as limited by remaining in India.

#### Plans and preparation

Roughly 630 million of the world's adults may dream of moving to other countries, but less than one tenth of them – about 48 million adults – are planning to make the move in the next 12 months. Less than half of those who are in the planning stages – about 19 million – are actually making the necessary preparations to move, such as applying for visas or residency and purchasing tickets.

It is impossible to pinpoint one factor that explains why some adults' desire to migrate does not progress beyond the dream stage while others advance to the planning and preparation stages. Many factors can influence the situation:

- Potential migrants' personal circumstances – their finances, health, family situations and their job status – can keep them at home or keep them moving. They may need to move to find work or to find better jobs. Their personal characteristics may also play a role – if they are naturally risk-takers, they may be more willing to make the leap.
- Migration policies that make movement easy from one country to another, such as movement from one European Union country to another, could make planning and preparation easier. Conversely, policies – or the lack thereof – may create so many roadblocks to leaving or entering a recipient country that potential migrants become discouraged.

#### Plans to migrate in the next 12 months

Among adults who would like to migrate, those in the Middle East and North Africa are the most likely worldwide to say they plan to leave their countries

<sup>2</sup> These results are based on interviews with 107,404 adults in 105 countries in 2009 and 2010. Gallup classifies respondents as "employed" if they are employed full-time or are employed part-time but do not want to work full-time. Respondents are "underemployed" if they are employed part-time but want to work full-time or are unemployed. Those "not in the workforce" are not working and are not looking for and/or available for work. They may be full-time students, retired, disabled or homemakers, though they may not fit any of these scenarios.

permanently in the next 12 months, Gallup finds. While 21 per cent of adults in the Middle East and North Africa overall say they would leave if they could, 16 per cent of them – or about 6 million adults – are planning to do so in the next year. The numbers who are planning to go range widely in the region: 25 per cent of potential migrants living in Gulf Cooperation Council countries say they plan to move in the next 12 months, while 14 per cent in North Africa have the same plans.

Figure 5

Percentage planning to move to another country in the next 12 months ranges by region	
Among those who desire to move to another country permanently	
Region	%
Middle East and North Africa	16%
Sub-Saharan Africa	12%
Americas	10%
Asia	7%
Europe	5%

Twelve per cent of potential migrant adults in sub-Saharan Africa say they are planning to move to another country permanently in the next year, while 10 per cent of potential migrant adults in the Americas indicate their plans to move. In all other major regions, the percentage planning to move does not rise out of the single digits. Seven per cent of potential migrants in Asia are planning to move in the next year, as are 5 per cent of potential migrants in Europe.

### Age and education are less of a factor at the planning stage and more in preparation

While factors such as age and education strongly relate to people’s desire to migrate worldwide, they do not matter as much in whether potential migrants are planning to move in the next 12 months.


In Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia, potential migrants in the 25 to 44 age group are only slightly more likely than those in other age groups to say they are planning to move in the next year. In Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and Latin America, education makes some difference in potential migrants’ likelihood to plan; those with the highest education are more likely to say they plan to move in the near future. Education makes the most difference in developing Asia.

While education makes only a slight difference among planners, it makes a significant difference among preparers. The likelihood that potential migrants are actively preparing to migrate increases with education level and is nearly twice as high among the most educated as those in other education groups.

### Those preparing to move are more likely to be employed at capacity

While underemployed adults in many parts of the world are often the most likely to say they would like to move to another country permanently if given the chance,

Map



they are also more likely to say they are planning to go. For example, in the Middle East and North Africa, potential migrants who are underemployed (33%) are nearly three times more likely to say they are planning to migrate than those who are employed at capacity (13%) or those not in the workforce (12%).

However, those who are working at capacity are the most likely to say they are making the necessary preparations to move. Underemployed potential migrants (28%) are actually the least likely to say they are taking steps to migrate.

Worldwide, those whose work falls under the “professional” category are more likely to desire to migrate than those who are “not employed” or those whose work falls into a category other than “professional.” While job type does not appear to influence the likelihood to plan migration, it makes a difference in regard to making preparations to migrate. A majority (54%) of potential migrants who are “professionals” say they are actively preparing to move.

### **Social networks and remittances are vital at all stages**

The important role that transnational social networks play in migration is evident, regardless of whether

people are only dreaming of moving to another country or actually planning and preparing to go. Adults who can rely on help from friends and family in other countries when they need it are nearly three times more likely to say they would like to migrate (30%) than those who do not have these types of networks (11%).

Adults who receive help from abroad in reality – not hypothetically – through remittances are also more likely to find the idea of moving to another country desirable. Among those whose households receive remittances from another country, 38 per cent say they would like to relocate permanently, while 12 per cent of those who do not receive this type of help say they would like to move to another country. This pattern persists at the planning and preparation stages.

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# Global views on immigration: lessons learned from an international online poll conducted by Ipsos

Keren Gottfried<sup>1</sup>

Governments may have many good reasons to pursue increases in immigrant populations; however, policymakers must be aware that public opinion does not hold favourable views towards migrants to their country. This phenomenon, consistent around the world, bears examining, given that public opinion plays a unique role in determining public policy in democratic states (and, increasingly, in non-democratic states as well). Any attempts to liberalize borders or expand integration should be done with this understanding in mind. Policymakers can determine which opinions held by the general population are legitimate or grounded in fact, and which are perpetuated by ill-founded beliefs. Promoting a culture of tolerance, and enacting educational campaigns to correct any wayward beliefs, will be up to those who wish to shift a decidedly negative public body.

A poll conducted by global research company Ipsos has found that nearly one half (45%) of global citizens in 24 countries surveyed believe that “immigration has generally had a negative impact on their country”, compared to three in 10 (29%) who believe it has been neither positive nor negative and only two in 10 (21%) who believe the impact has been positive. This article sketches the geographic, demographic and economic undertones to this global point of view.

## How we collected our data

For the past two years, Ipsos has operated Global @dvisor, a regular monthly online survey in 24 countries around the world with approximately 18,500 respondents every month. The survey is conducted in large part through our partnership with Reuters and the fielding of our Reuters Consumer Sentiment Index, a set of 17 questions assessing global economic confidence and general well-being.

This is a shared syndicate “omnibus” poll – meaning that varieties of different organizations place their own proprietary questions on the polling vehicle and then receive the data after it is collected for their section

approximately 30 days after the study is launched. In addition to the Reuters questions, clients add proprietary questions on the poll at marginal cost.

Our poll on attitudes towards immigration ran in 23 countries via the Ipsos Online Panel system. An international sample of 17,601 adults aged 18–64 in the United States and Canada, and aged 16–64 in all other countries, were interviewed between 15 June and 28 June 2011. The countries reporting herein were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America.

Approximately 1,000+ individuals participated in each country except: Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden and Turkey, where each had a sample of 500+. Weighting was then employed to balance demographics and ensure that the sample’s composition reflected that of the adult population according to the most recent country census data, and to provide results intended to approximate the sample universe. The online population was typically reflective of the general population in each country except for South Africa and India, where the sample was more affluent due to their rates of online penetration.

A survey with an unweighted probability sample of this size and a 100 per cent response rate would have an estimated margin of error of +/-3.1 percentage points for a sample of 1,000 and an estimated margin of error of +/- 4.5 percentage points for a sample of 500.

Global @dvisor is one of the only worldwide proprietary surveys run on a regular basis. Our samples allow us to look at the data in a myriad of ways: by country, region, gender, age, household income, marital status, education, chief income earner, employment, business owner and senior/executive decision maker in the workplace.

## What we asked: the questionnaire

The purpose of our study was to gather a preliminary understanding of general assessments of immigrants within each participating country. While these simple

<sup>1</sup> Keren Gottfried is Research Manager with the Public Opinion Polling division of Ipsos. She is responsible for the research and media relations of Global @dvisor, its monthly online research service in 24 countries. She can be reached at [keren.gottfried@ipsos.com](mailto:keren.gottfried@ipsos.com). For information about Ipsos and access to Media and Polling Releases, as well as our original release on the Immigration data, go to: <http://www.ipsos.com>



questions only scratch the surface on the topic, the general results provide a jumping point for more in-depth research. We asked the general population in the 23 countries the following questions:

Over the last 5 years, in your opinion has the amount of migrants in [country]....?

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Stayed the same
- Decreased a little
- Decreased a lot

Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on [country]?

- Very positive
- Fairly positive
- Neither positive or negative
- Fairly negative
- Very negative
- Don't know

Please tell whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

- Immigration is good for the economy of [country]
- Immigrants make [country] a more interesting place to live
- Immigration has placed too much pressure on public services in [country] (for example, health, transport, educational services)
- Immigrants in [country] have made it more difficult for [host country nationality] people to get jobs
- Priority should be given to immigrants with higher education and qualifications who can fill shortages among certain professions in [country]
- There are too many immigrants in our country

### Preliminary findings: too many immigrants

Eight in 10 (80%) citizens in the 23 countries polled believe that over the last five years the amount of migrants in their country has increased; half (51%) say the amount has increased "a lot" and three in 10 (29%) say "a little".

The intensity of this view sets the backdrop for generally critical views of this perceived increase. Nearly one half (45%) of citizens believe "immigration has generally had a negative impact on their country" (16% very negative, 29% fairly negative) while just one in five (21%) think the impact has been positive (5% very, 17% somewhat) and all others (29%) are on the fence.

Half of all respondents believe there are too many immigrants in their country (52%), that they have made it more difficult for their country's nationals to get jobs

(48%), and that they place too much pressure on their country's public services (51%).

Three in 10 (28%) agree that immigration is good for their economy and half (45%) agree that "priority should be given to immigrants with higher education and qualifications who can fill shortages among certain professions". Only three in 10 (31%) respondents agree that "immigrants make their country a more interesting place to live".

### Geographic and demographic factors

Of course, there is much variation across the 23 countries on these assessment points. Regionally, the Middle East and Africa (54%) are most likely to believe that immigration has generally been negative for their country, followed by Europe (53%), North America (46%), Asia-Pacific (35%) and Latin America (31%).

Nationally, our poll found that those with the strongest negative opinion on this measure are from Belgium (72%), South Africa (70%), the Russian Federation (69%), Great Britain (64%), Turkey (57%), the United States (56%), Italy (56%) and Spain (55%).

Three in 10 (29%) respondents are clearly in the middle on the sentiment, believing the impact is neither positive nor negative with those from Brazil (49%), the Republic of Korea (47%), Japan (46%) and Mexico (46%), Turkey (35%), Hungary (34%) and Argentina (32%) being the most neutral on the issue. Those citizens who are most likely to believe immigration has generally had a positive impact on their country still only hold these positive views softly; those in India (43%), Canada (39%), Saudi Arabia (38%), Sweden (37%), Australia (31%), Brazil (30%) and Indonesia (30%) are most likely to say the impact has been positive.

Those most likely to respond that immigration has been generally negative are also among those most likely to say the amount of immigrants in their country has increased in the last five years: Belgium (94%), Italy (93%), South Africa (91%), the Russian Federation (90%), Argentina (89%), Great Britain (85%) and Spain (85%). A similar group is also most likely to agree "there are too many immigrants in their country": the Russian Federation (77%), Belgium (72%), Great Britain (71%), Italy (67%), Spain (67%), South Africa (66%) and Argentina (61%).

Demographically, household income appears to be an indicator as those with a high level of income (52%) are more likely than those with middle (43%) and lower (41%) incomes to respond that immigration has been negative. Educational affluence also seems impactful since those with a lower level of education are significantly more likely to say that immigration has generally had a negative impact on their country (48%) than those with a higher education (39%) level.

## Economic vulnerability

The questions we fielded on the topic of immigration only surveyed what people felt; we didn't ask why. However, in cross-tabulating the data across our economic confidence and general satisfaction battery, we can begin to see a picture that is rooted in specific attitudes.

We investigated how sentiments across 17 different economic and general satisfaction assessment indicators related to feelings towards immigration. Those indicators cover the following topics: economic confidence, personal financial situation, general satisfaction with life and country, job security, and likelihood to invest. We compared samples that represent positive or negative sentiments on these 17 measures to investigate a possible relationship between economic confidence and anti-immigrant sentiment.

We found that economic attitudes do appear to influence one's likelihood to say that immigration has had a negative impact on one's country. In particular, lack of economic confidence in both local and national economies, in one's personal financial situation, and assessing the country as going in the wrong direction make one more likely to see immigration as negative.

Table 1 shows that those who say they expect the economy in their local area to be weaker six months from now (55%) are 21 points more likely than those who expect their local economy to be stronger (34%) and 10 points more likely than the global aggregate average (45%) to say that immigration has generally had a negative impact. Similarly, those who say their personal financial situation will be weaker six months from now

(55%), those who rate the economy in their local area as weak (52%), those who say their country is off on the wrong track (51%) and those who rate the current economic situation in their country to be bad (51%) are significantly more likely than the average citizen to say immigration has had a negative impact.

In fact, on each of the 17 measures, the samples that provided negative/dissatisfied responses were more likely to say immigrants have generally had a negative impact on the country than the samples that provided positive/satisfied responses.

On the other hand, as shown in Table 2, those least likely to say immigrants have had a generally negative impact on the country are those who expect the economy in their local area to be stronger in six months (34%), those who assess their country as generally heading in the right direction (34%) and those satisfied with the way things are going in their country (34%).

The top attitudinal indicators of negative sentiments towards immigrants vary across some regions. Table 3 shows that Europe and Latin America have the same top three indicators as the global aggregate, but in North America (58%) and in Middle East and Africa (71%) those who rate the current national economic situation in their country to be bad are the third most likely in their region to say immigrants have been a negative force.

Asia-Pacific varies most widely; it is the only region where the top indicator of negative sentiments towards the impact of immigrants on their country is saying that, taking all things together, they are not happy (43%). Next in line is that of people rating their current financial situation as weak (42%).

Table 1:

Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on [country]? (at least 5 points ABOVE global aggregate)	
% who said it has been NEGATIVE	%
<b>GLOBAL AGGREGATE</b>	<b>45</b>
Expect economy in local area to be WEAKER in 6 months	55
Expect personal financial situation to be WEAKER in 6 months	55
Rate current economic situation in local area as WEAK	52
Assess country as heading off on the WRONG TRACK	51
Describe current national economic situation as BAD	51
Taking all things together, say they are NOT HAPPY	50
Are LESS CONFIDENT in ability to invest in future than 6 months ago	50
Feel DISSATISFIED with the way things are going in country today	50

**Table 2:**

<b>Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on [country]?</b> (at least 5 points BELOW global aggregate)	
<b>% who said it has been NEGATIVE</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>GLOBAL AGGREGATE</b>	<b>45</b>
Expect economy in local area to be STRONGER in 6 months	34
Assess country as heading in the RIGHT DIRECTION	34
Feel SATISFIED with the way things are going in country today	34
Are MORE CONFIDENT in ability to invest in future than 6 months ago	36
Describe current national economic situation as GOOD	36
Expect personal financial situation to be STRONGER in 6 months	36
Rate current economic situation in local area as STRONG	36
Think next 30 days will be a GOOD TIME to invest in stock market	37
Are MORE COMFORTABLE making major purchases (home, car) than 6 months ago	38
Are MORE COMFORTABLE making other household purchases than 6 months ago	38
Are MORE CONFIDENT in job security for self/people known personally than 6 months ago	39
Rate current financial situation as STRONG	40

**Table 3:**

<b>Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on [country]?</b> (top attitudinal statements in each region highlighted in blue)						
<b>% who said it has been NEGATIVE</b>	<b>GLOBAL</b>	<b>North America</b>	<b>Latin America</b>	<b>Europe</b>	<b>Asia-Pacific</b>	<b>Middle East/Africa</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45</b>	46	31	53	35	54
Expect economy in local area to be WEAKER in 6 months	55	61	52	58	39	78
Expect personal financial situation to be WEAKER in 6 months	55	56	58	57	39	76
Rate current economic situation in local area as WEAK	52	60	40	57	41	68
Assess country as heading off on the WRONG TRACK	51	55	35	56	39	70
Describe current national economic situation as BAD	51	58	36	56	39	71
Taking all things together, say they are NOT HAPPY	50	51	39	56	43	57
Are LESS CONFIDENT in ability to invest in future than 6 months ago	50	52	39	55	40	64
Feel DISSATISFIED with the way things are going in country today	50	55	35	56	40	64
Rate current financial situation as WEAK	49	49	34	55	42	63
Are LESS COMFORTABLE making other household purchases than 6 months ago	49	49	36	55	39	64
Are LESS CONFIDENT in job security for self/people known personally than 6 months ago	49	52	37	55	38	62
Say it is LIKELY someone they know personally will lose job in next 6 months due to economic conditions	49	50	37	55	41	59

# Communicating effectively about migration: key findings from IOM's World Migration Report 2011

Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko<sup>1</sup>

Few areas of public policy are subject to greater misrepresentation in public and political discourse, yet more influenced by public opinion, than international migration. Despite the communications revolution, many remain poorly informed about the scale, scope and socio-economic context of migration. Communicating effectively about migration is critical since managing migration also implies managing how migrants are perceived in society. Accurately informing relevant stakeholders and the wider public about migration may be the single most important policy tool in all societies faced with increasing diversity.

Societies with a rich diversity of skills and experiences are better placed to stimulate growth through their human resources, and migration is one of the ways in which the exchange of talent, services and skills can be fostered. Yet migration remains highly politicized and often negatively perceived, despite the obvious need for diversification in today's rapidly evolving societies and economies. Nevertheless, international migration is likely to increase in scale and complexity due to growing demographic disparities, new global and political dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks, with profound impacts on the socio-economic and ethnic composition of societies. This will result in new policy challenges related to the successful integration of migrants into the host society, how they are perceived in their countries of origin and, more broadly, the way migration is experienced by the community at large. In this context, the image of migrants in their home and host societies acquires fundamental importance.

This article discusses some of the key findings from IOM's *World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration*, which was published in December 2011 in celebration of IOM's sixtieth anniversary.<sup>2</sup> The report addresses the challenges faced in this era of globalization and unprecedented human mobility by calling for a fundamental shift in the way we communicate about migration.

## Addressing perceptions about migrants and migration

Public opinion and perceptions about migration vary between and within countries (as well as between

subgroups within a community) and over time. Given such nuances, it is not possible to isolate a single public opinion, yet claims based on public opinion often gain saliency in political and public discourse.

One of the most consistent findings of IOM's *World Migration Report 2011* is the overestimation of the absolute numbers of migrants in a given country/region or of the proportion of the population that migrants represent. Estimates tend to be even higher for irregular migrants. Research findings also show that when survey respondents are provided with more information about migrants/migration, rather than simply being asked if they think there are "too many migrants", their responses tend to be more favourable. Findings are therefore influenced by prevailing conventional wisdom, the way survey questions are worded (whether they are biased or not) and the respondents' understanding of what "migrant" means (labour migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker, irregular migrant). The latter can also influence the extent to which migrants are perceived to contribute or not to a given place.

The vast majority of research, however, focuses on opinions and perceptions in countries of destination. Considerably less empirical research has been done on the country of origin perspective, with regard to emigration or return, although both factors are increasingly recognized at the policy level as being highly important issues. Findings of smaller-scale surveys or qualitative studies show that public opinion can vary greatly, with emigrants being considered, by some, to have abandoned the home country and, by others, to be national heroes. Opinions are also shaped by factors such as the length of time the migrant is abroad, the impact on the community or family left behind, the economic situation of the home country, and an understanding of the migration process or the migrants' experience abroad.

A closer look at public opinion also reveals that, even in times of economic recession or crisis when negativity towards migrants may be higher, migration is not the issue of primary concern. It is, nonetheless, consistently present in opinion polls, which is not surprising, given its cross-cutting nature and linkage to wider socio-economic issues. The populist nature of migration debates in many parts of the world today has created a climate in which it is all too easy to see migrants as responsible – directly or indirectly – for unemployment, security issues or a lack of social cohesion, among others. These concerns, rooted in much more complex processes of change, will

<sup>1</sup> Gervais Appave is Special Adviser to the Director General of IOM. Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOM Headquarters and co-editor of *Migration Policy Practice*.

<sup>2</sup> The full version of the World Migration Report 2011 can be downloaded from [http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main\\_page=product\\_info&cPath=37&products\\_id=752&zenid=b7bfe77ca326680af2214431c21e008](http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=37&products_id=752&zenid=b7bfe77ca326680af2214431c21e008).

not be dispelled simply by making migration policies more restrictive. By unilaterally addressing migration, the wrong message is sent: that migration was indeed the cause of the perceived problem. What it does not do is address what is at the core of a population's concerns, which may or may not be migration, per se. When considering more carefully what is behind opinion poll results, it becomes clear that not all opinions are necessarily negative and that any deep-rooted concerns expressed often go beyond solely migration.

### Media, politics and the evidence base

Mobility is an accepted feature of contemporary society and there is a certain level of understanding, recognition and even appreciation of the fact that migration brings added benefits to the economy. However, distorted communication about migration can trigger a vicious cycle that leads to misinformation being perpetuated through government policy, the mass media, the public at large and vice versa, which can, in turn, skew discourse at all levels. Policies and political discourse can therefore play a major role in shaping the image of migrants in home and host societies. One of the biggest challenges in this regard is what and how governments communicate about migrants and migration policy to the wider public. It is apparent that migration is often the catch-all issue that masks the public's fears and uncertainties relating to unemployment, housing or social cohesion (in countries of destination) or loss/waste of human capital and economic dependency (in countries of origin).

Although direct causal links between media reporting and the influence on public opinion or policy cannot be made, the media do shape attitudes in significant ways. The findings of media content analysis, presented in IOM's *World Migration Report 2011*, show that the media are often the public's primary source of information (in terms of statistics, trends, analysis) about migrants and migration. Furthermore, the media can frame the debate by highlighting certain aspects of migration and not others (such as illegality), through episodic coverage or by exaggerating the facts. Unbalanced coverage may also be a reflection of the evolving nature of the media, which have become increasingly commercialized over the last two decades.

Despite the growing body of evidence attesting to the benefits and costs of migration, there is a disconnect between the producers (academics, political analysts) and users (politicians, media, the wider public) of the evidence base. IOM's report points to several reasons for this: discourse tends to focus more on politics rather than facts – for example, opinions of key stakeholders such as employers are often underreported; academic research has also only recently begun to take account of migration as an independent priority interest; policymakers face challenges in communicating

migration facts and figures to the public, together with the related policies; a lack of migration policy evaluation prevents any firm conclusions being drawn about which policies are effective; and, finally, there is a lack of knowledge among the media on how to accurately report on migration issues. The limited use of evidence in migration policymaking (or the misuse of evidence for political purposes) and the lack of evaluation of the impact of migration policies can also mean that any policy failures are more easily attributed to the migrants themselves.

Finally, inaccurate representation of migrants and migration directly impacts migrants themselves. In host countries, the mass media often serve as a reference point for incoming migrants about the society they now live in. Evidence shows that migrants are very much aware of stereotyping and negative portrayals, especially in the media, which can lead to a sense of marginalization if left unchecked or if migrants' views are not given equal coverage.

### The way forward

The *World Migration Report 2011* highlights several examples of good practice among governments, civil society, international organizations and the media which have actively worked towards communicating effectively about migration. These initiatives do so by, for example, promoting a positive image of migrants and their contributions, dispelling migration myths through information or media campaigns, and giving migrants a voice in sharing their experiences. However, for such initiatives to have a lasting impact, they often need to be scaled up, adjusted to fit local contexts and, most importantly, be supported by strong political will as part of a long-term strategy.

#### **1) Building an open, balanced and comprehensive migration discourse**

Here, the emphasis is on expanding the migration debate so that it does not simply revolve endlessly around the problems – real or imagined (both of which are generously aired) – but examines the broader picture. It is important that the new debate be proactive and not simply reactive to the dominant discourse. There are two questions that are commonly used as starting points for discussions on migration, not to mention migration policy formulation: 1) *How to deal with the migrant constituencies already in the country?* 2) *How to deal with those migrants who may be coming?* A constructive, better-informed debate will begin with a broader consideration of the place that migration might realistically occupy in demographic, social and economic planning. From this perspective, it may be possible to reframe the discourse so that it yields a more informed mainstream consensus, rather than a parochial view. The discourse should also extend beyond the national

level to multilateral forums such as regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs), IOM's International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).

## **2) *Depoliticizing the debate and directly addressing issues of concern***

Many of the negative perceptions surrounding migration have their origins in partisan interpretations, rather than fact. There is, in any case, a need to openly discuss effects – both positive and negative – in an open and balanced way. The discourse should also address the broad national interest, rather than focusing on the interests of particular segments of society. Much of the research on the positive effects of migration relates to an entire society and economy. The force of these messages can be lost if the focus is placed upon impacts on particular subgroups in a given society or economy. On the other hand, discussion of local anxieties – for example, about what can be done to curb irregular migration, or local pressures on infrastructure caused by population growth – need not be avoided; the public should, instead, be informed about what has and has not worked, without blame for failed policy initiatives being placed solely on the migrant.

A lack of readily available information for the public, which directly addresses all of these issues, is perhaps the greatest cause of continuing misunderstanding. The dissemination of information that addresses the concerns at hand, clearly explaining the rights of citizens and non-citizens, helps eliminate misunderstandings and ensures that policies are perceived as fair and respectful of everyone's rights.

## **3) *Working with the media to support balanced media reporting***

The media have significant influence over public discourse, shaping public opinion and thereby affecting all stakeholders, especially policymakers and politicians. A fundamental question must therefore be asked: How can the media be engaged to present a more balanced picture of migration and its impacts? Balanced media reporting means avoiding single-issue headlines, over/under-representation of particular groups, and blanket labelling. It also implies recognition of the fact that migrants are not a homogenous group and that migration is often linked to many other public issues.

Governments play a crucial role in creating the social and political climate in which fair and accurate reporting can thrive and the evidence base is correctly used. Leadership is therefore important in delivering a more balanced picture about migration. This places significant responsibility on political opinion leaders, but they should not be the only source of leadership on this issue.

Other stakeholders, such as civil society, the private sector and the academic research community, also have an important role to play. Their role may involve working more closely with the media than has been the case in the past. While this may also be outside of the media's comfort zone to some extent, it is the responsibility of these actors to meet the media halfway, to ensure that the media are better informed of the complexity of migration issues.

Providing guidance on how to report on migration is another key element. Building the capacity of reporters and journalists, among others, either through training or informational materials, can help to create a core group of media specialists who are able to more accurately report on the topic. The provision of easily accessible guidelines on how to talk about migration provides a good starting point. Such guidance should ideally include the development of communication strategies, on the part of researchers, and the creation of partnerships within the media. The research community itself can play a key role in ensuring that its findings relate to the relevant policy and political context and that it actively engages in the debate, using the evidence and their expertise, without compromising their academic integrity.

Balanced media reporting also requires breaking down the barriers of diversity within the media. The removal of structural discrimination in mainstream media institutions to include a diverse group of people serves, in turn, to break down content discrimination by offering alternative points of view.

## **4) *Acknowledging migrants as active communication agents***

Clearly, one of the greatest challenges for all those wishing to promote accurate perceptions about migrants and migration is that of enabling the authentic voices of migrants to be heard. There is clear evidence that the more exposure non-migrants have to migrants, on a person-to-person basis, the less negative they are inclined to be towards them. However, migrants are too often viewed as passive agents in the migration debate, in both their countries of origin and their countries of destination.

One significant way of reducing the level of misperception and its impact on migrants, whether as a result of political discourse or media reporting, is to ensure that migrants become active participants in the public debate. This can be done in many ways – for instance, by creating more space for ethnic media alongside mainstream media, integrating diversity into mainstream media, or encouraging the use of new social media tools to allow migrants to engage with a wide audience (migrants and non-migrants) and to portray more accurate images of who they are and what they do.

# Migration and global environmental change: priorities for policymakers

Richard Black and Stephen R. G. Bennett<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Environmental phenomena already influence patterns of human migration because of the dangers and hardships brought about by floods, drought and ecosystem degradation. The world's environment is changing, not least as a result of greenhouse gas emissions. Yet an understanding of how environmental change may affect future migration has, up to this point, been the subject of considerable disagreement between researchers and indeed between policymakers. Resulting policy approaches have, perhaps unsurprisingly, lurched between disparate and sometimes contradictory standpoints, ranging from those trying to develop definitions of “climate migrants” right through to those who want as few to move as possible.

In the recent Foresight report, *Migration and Global Environmental Change*,<sup>2</sup> it is argued that, in the context of global environmental change, people rarely move for just one reason. Rather, there are complex factors driving any individual decision to migrate, as well as a range of important constraints. Furthermore, it is simplistic to think that people only move away from environmental change; the analysis also shows that many people are moving towards increasingly risky environments, and indeed there is a hidden group who is unable to move from dangers at all.

Yet the report argues that good policy can be developed even in this context of uncertainty. This includes policies that shun concerted, state-led approaches to managing where populations are located and instead take starting points at understanding how individuals act and, most importantly, how individuals prepare and adapt to environmental change. The report argues that, in the context of a growing population, migration, whether internal or external, is likely to continue. Policies that embrace the potential of migration to contribute to long-term resilience, in the right circumstances, are more strategic in their approach to the climate-migration issue.

## Future environmental change and migration

People have always migrated, and for a host of reasons. Current estimates are that there are over 200 million people who have migrated from their home country to another, and around 740 million who have relocated within their own country. Over the past several decades, a great deal of this movement involved migration from rural and mountainous areas to cities.

There are several key drivers of these movements (see Figure 1). The majority of people who move in low-income countries do so for economic reasons: they look for better employment opportunities, higher wages, or diversification of livelihood, especially if agriculture becomes unsustainable as a way of life. Some seek education, or move to be with family members. Others wish to escape political persecution, or insecurity due to war and conflict; some are forcibly relocated for political reasons. And some are compelled to flee from environmental hazards, such as floods, infertile agricultural land or lack of water resources.


All of these drivers of migration may be influenced by environmental change. Sea-level rise is already making some low-lying coastal regions more prone to flooding, causing displacement directly but also affecting economic conditions. While it remains difficult if not impossible to attribute extreme weather events to global warming, climate models predict increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather, which could cause greater flooding. Drought and depletion of water resources not only can damage harvests but, through processes such as salinization, can leave soils permanently unfit for cultivation. The retreat of glaciers and ice sheets, and the degradation of marine ecosystems, may have social, economic and political effects well beyond mountain and coastal regions.

Moreover, there is no simple relationship between environmental change and migration. Although environmental factors might add to incentives to move, it may also limit people's ability to do so, for example by exacerbating their economic disadvantages leading in the long run to populations being trapped in vulnerable circumstances. And even if migration is not itself directly prompted by environmental change, such change can have important implications for mobility. In particular, the movement of people to large cities can place greater numbers at risk of flooding in low-lying plains or deltas, such as in the fast-growing cities of Mumbai and Lagos. In Dakar, Senegal, 40 per cent of those who moved there

<sup>1</sup> Richard Black is the chair of the lead expert group which provided the technical direction to the Foresight Migration and Global Environmental Change report; he is also the Head of the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex. Stephen R. G. Bennett is the project leader for Migration and Global Environmental Change and is part of the Foresight Programme, UK Government Office for Science (<http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight>; [foresightweb@bis.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:foresightweb@bis.gsi.gov.uk)).

<sup>2</sup> Full report available at <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/foresight/docs/migration/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf>

Figure 1: Foresight’s conceptual framework for how environmental change affects migration



between 1998 and 2008 live in areas of high flood risk. The report estimates that by 2060 between 700 million and 1 billion people in Asia will live in low-elevation coastal zones vulnerable to floods.

### Priorities for policymakers

Two priorities that require urgent attention are identified in the report. First, far more is needed to address the challenges faced by urban areas, which will experience the bulk of future migration, including that related to environmental change. Second, policies are needed to free up migration at national and regional levels, where this represents an adaptation to environmental change. We then show how these policies fit within the report’s wider policy framework to address migration in the context of environmental change.

#### 1. Attention to cities

Work commissioned for the Foresight report highlights the huge growth in numbers of people likely to be living in urban coastal flooding zones over the next 50 years. For example, compared to 2000, there may be between 114 million and 192 million additional people living in floodplains in urban areas in Africa and Asia by 2060, in alternative scenarios of the future.

However there has been relatively little attention given to urban planning in the face of both long-term environmental transformation and long-term migration. This needs to change. Decisions made now will influence how cities will cope with migration and environmental change over the next 50 years. Yet much city planning in poorer countries fails to deal adequately with the needs of current residents, in terms of housing, health, water and sanitation, employment and transport, let alone those who will inevitably come over the next 20–50 years.

The report argues strongly that the challenge is not to prevent rural-to-urban migration. Not only is this likely to be futile (government policies to disincentivize urban migration in Africa have not had a discernible effect), but it would probably have unfavourable outcomes such as the growth of large informal settlements. Instead, cities must be made adaptive and resilient to rapid growth and to the risks of environmental change. This demands attention to almost every aspect of urban life.

In particular, there needs to be an urgent focus on the availability and quality of water. Already, 150 million people live in cities with water shortages. Solutions could involve engineering projects to improve water-supply infrastructure, but also more effective management of water demand and use. Managing water also includes flood hazards: a World Bank study of poor urban households in Kenyan and Nicaraguan cities, for instance, found that immigrant populations are disproportionately exposed to flood risks. Cyclones and storm surges are very likely to pose increased flood risks for coastal cities in the future, as the case of New Orleans in 2005 amply demonstrated.

Making existing cities resilient to growth might sometimes not be enough. Policies must also embrace the option of creating new cities and settlements, not least so that these do not appear in any way as unplanned ghettos. In Kusaya on the fringes of Cape Town in South Africa, the replacement since 1994 of informal squatter dwellings with housing that incorporates energy-conserving elements such as solar panels and insulation has resulted in substantial health improvements and a reduction in poverty and crime. It may become necessary in the future to extend such projects to the creation of free-standing new cities in safe locations, which needs to happen in a way that does not exacerbate tensions between locals and migrants.



## 2. Attention to facilitating migration

International funding and policy related to migration influenced by environmental change may be more effective if they begin from recognition that migration can be part of the solution. Indeed, measures to try to prevent it risk making matters worse. Rather than trying to create resilience in situ at all costs, a more effective approach may be to focus on ways to build on the opportunities and productivity of migration.

This does not mean the facilitated resettlement of entire vulnerable populations. Such an approach brings many potential problems and should be considered only as a last resort. Rather, the emphasis should be on encouraging individuals and households to find their own solutions, reached in an informed way.

A key goal is to ensure that both migrants themselves and the communities into which they settle experience benefits from migration. Many migrants bring with them skills and knowledge that can be useful to host populations, provided that economic, professional, cultural and linguistic hurdles are recognized and addressed as appropriate. Others may become more productive if they have access to education.

Some migrants move in order to earn money that can be transferred to family members back home. For example, migrants from mountain areas in Nepal, China, Pakistan and India generated remittances which were often used to improve the situation of households in their source areas. In the right circumstances, such migration, by serving the interests of those who remain, can be a self-limiting adaptation that avoids wholesale relocation. It can be promoted by ensuring easy and secure flows of remittances, as well as by providing credit that can bridge the period before remittances begin to arrive.

Often this type of migration can be “circular”, so that migrants retain a commitment to their place of origin in practical as well as financial terms. A range of migration policy options can include provision for shorter- or longer-term stays, for example through issuing multiple-entry visas or reducing border formalities.

## 3. A framework for policy to address migration in the context of environmental change

The first policy priority discussed earlier – dealing with the impact of migration on increasingly vulnerable urban areas – is based on a broader approach which acknowledges that migration is highly likely to continue to occur, especially within countries and regions. The second policy priority goes beyond neutral recognition that migration is likely to occur, and is founded on an approach which positively embraces opportunities in migration to assist adaptation to environmental change. Table 1 shows that these are two important parts of the

report’s policy framework to address migration in the context of global environmental change.

**Table 1: The policy framework: three approaches to policy to address migration in the context of global environmental change<sup>3</sup>**

Approach to policy:	Reduce the influence of global environmental change (GEC) on migration
<i>Policies</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Limit or slow environmental change</i></li> <li>• <i>Reduce the impact of environmental change</i></li> <li>• <i>Increase resilience to environmental change</i></li> </ul>
Approach to policy:	Plan for/respond to migration in the context of GEC
<i>Policies</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Plan for urban growth and adaptation</i></li> <li>• <i>Address protection gaps</i></li> <li>• <i>Mitigate social tensions and conflict</i></li> </ul>
Approach to policy:	Recognize migration as an adaptation to GEC
<i>Policies</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Facilitate migration as adaptation</i></li> <li>• <i>Relocate communities</i></li> <li>• <i>Build new cities</i></li> </ul>

This framework includes one approach to policies which has yet to be described in this article. This approach can be characterized as “policies to reduce the impact of environmental change on the drivers of migration”, and, in various guises, is often policymakers’ first priority. The Foresight report argues instead that optimum policymaking should pursue all three approaches simultaneously – reducing the impact of environmental change, while accepting that migration will occur, and realizing the benefits of migration. The reason for this is that attempts to reduce the impact of environmental change on the drivers of migration are never likely to fully eliminate migration, and should not be formulated in a way to try and do so.

Mitigation of climate change is clearly important. However, current greenhouse gas emissions have already committed the planet to significant change over the next 20 years at least, and may only have an impact on migration towards the end of the timescale considered in the Foresight report, which looks forward to 2060.

Measures to reduce the impacts of environmental change are also essential, and include forecasting, warning and humanitarian response measures, infrastructure measures to protect against events such as flood protection schemes and water supply measures, and non-structural measures such as better land-use planning and using drought- or saline-resistant crops and agricultural techniques. However, the report’s

<sup>3</sup> All of the policies in this table, including their advantages and limitations (which are acute, for example, for “planned relocation”) are further described in the main Foresight report.

analysis shows that there are inevitably limits to the effectiveness of these approaches.

The report shares the view of much recent analysis on humanitarian emergencies that, while it is essential to prepare fully for the threats of a changing environment, it is important not just to focus on the impacts of environmental events, but to build *resilience* from the outset. Yet it is artificial to think of measures to build long-term resilience to environmental change in isolation from migration. There are many measures to enhance livelihoods, including improving access to markets, the provision of credit, and the diversification of income streams. Yet case study evidence shows these measures rarely stop migration. More pertinently, migration can often be an effective way to enhance the livelihoods of individuals, households or broader communities. Much research and policy attention currently focuses on the potential for insurance and social protection schemes to build the resilience of communities to environmental events. There are a number of implementation challenges to be addressed here, yet this is clearly an important avenue to explore. However, migration and the remittances that often result is often an important “surrogate” for insurance provision. There is a wealth of case study evidence, explored in the report, to show that the “insurance motive” contributes to the rationale behind much international and internal migration, and that remittance flows often increase following environmental incidences. Remittances flows, a function of migration, can be vital for households experiencing environmental events, and can, in the long run, can allow households to remain in situ.

## Conclusion

Conventional narratives about migration and global environmental change focus on the problem(s) of those who are forced to flee by deteriorating environmental circumstances. The Foresight report concludes that this is only part of the story. Rather, there is a much larger group of people for whom some degree of migration would be an important way of building adaptation to environmental change. Facilitating such migration has a much greater chance of building resilience to global environmental change in the long term under a wider range of future scenarios, compared to efforts to eliminate the “need” for people to migrate or state-led efforts to forcibly manage the location of people. Indeed, without attention to people’s mobility, it is likely that millions of people worldwide will effectively find themselves “trapped” in the face of major environmental threats.

This conclusion does not imply that efforts to mitigate environmental change or build resilience of populations in situ are irrelevant – they are clearly important whether people move or not – nor does it imply that migration is unproblematic. On the contrary, the report argues throughout that migrants’ rights need to be

protected – for example, through measures to promote decent work and living conditions in destinations of migrants and to include migrants in decision-making on building resilience in risky destination areas. The report also focuses on the potential social impacts of migration on communities.

In summary, the challenge for policymakers is to ensure that migration is one of a series of options for adaptation to environmental change, before such change has major negative effects on peoples’ livelihoods and well-being, while also ensuring that it brings positive effects for individuals and families and for the communities of origin and destination.

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# Migration Profiles: why and how to prepare them and how to make the most of the process

Marina Manke, Frank Laczko and Rudolf Anich<sup>1</sup>

**M**igration Profiles (MPs) were initially proposed by the European Commission in the Communication on Migration and Development in 2005, and since then different types of MPs have been prepared. Data on migration are often scattered between different ministries, and between countries of origin and destination, making it sometimes difficult to develop a coherent policy approach to migration. Originally, MPs were conceived of as a tool to provide concise information in a standardized form, making the migratory picture of the country clearer at one glance. Subsequently the MP has developed into a country-led process, involving dialogue and consultation with a wide range of migration actors, thereby contributing to greater policy coherence and evidence-based policymaking.

Migration Profiles help to identify data gaps, and to develop strategies to build capacities to collect better data on migration.

Substantial progress has been made in recent years to extend the MPs concept to a broader range of countries. Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of MPs that have been prepared around the world by different agencies since 2005. There are now many different kinds of documents which are labelled as MPs, but there remains a lack of a common understanding of what an MP is and how the process can contribute to policy development.

MIGRATION PROFILES are country-owned tools, prepared in consultation with a broad range of government and non-government stakeholders, which can be used to enhance policy coherence, evidence-based policymaking and the mainstreaming of migration into development plans.

This article explains how international partners can provide technical guidance and support to governments wishing to prepare a country migration profile. The article provides a summary of some of the key points made in an extensive guide, prepared by IOM, entitled Migration Profiles: Making the Most of the Process. This

guide can be found on the website of the Global Forum for Migration and Development, under the heading “Global Repository for Migration Profiles”.<sup>2</sup> The guide focuses on questions such as:

**Why prepare a Migration Profile?** MPs are a government-owned tool often developed in collaboration with a range of stakeholders. Migration Profiles can be prepared for a variety of purposes: to identify data gaps; to promote policy coherence; to understand better an emerging migration policy issue; to develop indicators of the impact of migration on development; and to facilitate the mainstreaming of migration into national development plans.

**How to prepare a Migration Profile?** Deciding on the appropriate MP exercise (depending on specific country needs) and clarifying objectives; identifying complementary capacity-building activities to run in parallel with the elaboration of the MP report; building the research team and engaging partners (e.g. technical working group, steering group); and planning outreach.

**How to carry out the research and analysis and select an appropriate template?** Mapping data sources/data assessment; discussing and adapting existing templates to the country’s migration situation; collecting and analysing data; consulting stakeholders; and ensuring quality control and effective research management.

**What financial and human resources are required to prepare a Migration Profile?** Costs and time required according to the components included in the MP exercise; the expertise required to prepare the report; and discussion of how to improve research quality through twinning exercises and the creation of peer review expert groups.

**How to finalize, launch the report and follow up?** Validating the final report; formulating policy recommendations; communicating the results of the MP report; elaborating a data strategy; and indicating data gaps for further research.

**How to ensure sustainability?** Linking MPs to policy development on an ongoing basis; carrying out training and orientation to build the capacities of governments; developing MPs into a monitoring and evaluation tool; and linking MPs to mainstreaming migration into development plans.

<sup>1</sup> Marina Manke is a Labour Migration/Migration and Development Specialist at IOM Vienna; Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at the IOM Headquarters in Geneva; and Rudolf Anich is a Research Officer at the IOM Headquarters in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.gfmd.org/>


## Migration Profiles and evidence-based policymaking

How can MPs contribute to evidence-based policymaking? Migration Profiles provide a means to collect and share data required for policymaking.

### Strengthening the evidence base:

- Develop an understanding of which evidence is needed to support policies on migration and the mainstreaming of migration into development plans.
- Ensure that the required evidence is produced and available on a regular basis, using a systematic framework.

Figure 1: Migration Profiles as a policymaking tool



Source: IOM, 2011.

### Broadening evidence application to policymaking:

- Enable policymakers to access the existing body of evidence in a simple and time-efficient way.
- Build policymakers' skills and practices in correctly interpreting available migration evidence and applying it directly to their policymaking decisions.


## Migration Profiles as a process

Analysing migratory trends and their impact on receiving and sending countries is a challenging task. The dynamic and complex nature of migration requires working with various data sources, often scattered between different agencies and created for administrative, rather than analytical, purposes. In many countries, migration management functions are spread among several stakeholders, often resulting in lack of information sharing and cooperation. Today, hardly anyone questions the significance of migration for development, or doubts that its consequences should be taken into consideration, but often the data required, inter alia, to mainstream migration into national development plans and design labour market policies is lacking.

Migration Profiles address the above challenges of lack of evidence and its application to migration policymaking. They aim to do the following:

- Map out national and international data sources on diverse migrant categories and their characteristics.
- Present recent statistics on migration stocks and flows in a concise and internationally comparable way.
- Compile and present data on the impact of migration on development.
- Support an inter-agency coordination platform, leading to better information flows, more coherent policy actions and enhanced cooperation modalities.

Figure 2: Three key stages of the MP process



Source: IOM, 2011.

### Stage 1: Establishing a framework – working with the government

A key obstacle to producing an objective, timely and policy-oriented analysis of migration is often due to the poor quality and lack of sharing of available data. Data are utilized to perform the functions of separate agencies, but seldom to develop longer-term policy responses on behalf of the whole government. Designing an effective and sustainable mechanism for the collection, sharing and analysis of migration data from various sources is the first and most important step of the MP process. The government's active participation at technical and decision-making levels, during all stages of the MP process, is the prime guarantee of MP sustainability beyond the initial launch. In various countries, actions at the framework-setting stage have included the following steps:

- Given the multiplicity of institutions and data sources involved, inter-agency frameworks for data sharing and coordination have been established, such as technical working groups or advisory statistical committees. Where inter-agency coordination mechanisms, namely migration committees or councils, already existed, the development and endorsement of a profile was added to their terms of reference or plans

of action. The key objectives of such consultation mechanisms have included developing a template relevant to national requirements. An example of the kind of themes that could be included in an MP template is presented in Figure 3. Other activities include supporting the local research consultant in data collection, providing input to the MP report at different stages of the drafting process, and deciding on follow-up actions.

- In addition to state authorities, non-governmental partners have been invited to participate in the development of MPs. Civil society organizations, research institutions and international agencies have often provided additional technical and expert input.
- In parallel to the creation of the inter-agency coordination mechanism, a strong expert team is often required to carry out the actual task of drafting the MP report. In addition to data collection, the work includes data quality control and cross-checking, trend and impact analysis, and presentation of findings in a comprehensive and easy-to-follow format. The preparation of an MP report requires statistical knowledge, analytical skills, and a broad understanding of not only migration, but also economics, politics, labour market issues and development planning. As finding this range of expertise in a single expert can be challenging, working with a whole team of experts who complement each other's skills has proven to be effective in several cases. A twinning approach, whereby a local expert works in cooperation with an international expert, often produces best-quality results.

### **Stage 2: Information collection and analysis**

Once the framework for developing a profile has been established, actual work on data collection and analysis starts. The key goal during this stage is to ensure that the expert team acquires access to all relevant data, including those produced by relevant authorities. Administrative data, such as border-crossing records or various permits for foreigners, often remain outside the focus of statistical offices and, thus, are not included in routine migration analyses. Successful actions during the second stage have included the following:

- Assessment of data sources and statistical capacities, identifying key gaps and obstacles, and developing recommendations on practical steps which could help enhance the availability and quality of migration statistics. Data assessment findings and recommendations could become separate reports or a section of the MP. In some countries, the results have been directly included by the governments into their data management plans.

- Establishment of a database for regular collection and storage of identified data sets from various agencies, thus creating a basis for time-series analysis and simplifying MP updates in the future.
- Technical assistance and capacity-building, such as workshops and training activities on information and database management, migration statistics, and targeted IT expertise and infrastructure upgrade.

### **Stage 3: Report launch and follow-up**


The final stage of the MP process is ensuring its endorsement by the government and setting the stage for follow-up actions, such as through:

- Presentation of the draft MP for validation at a workshop for government officials, policymakers and academics from all over the country.
- Continuation of capacity-building, now with the aim of building skills and mechanisms to apply MP findings directly to policy development.
- Development of national strategies including the establishment of specialized migration research and information centres to raise awareness of the value of migration information and research.
- Designation of a state institution (a migration authority or a statistical office) to take up the task of updating the MP on a regular basis, thus ensuring the sustainability of the MP exercise as well as the government's ownership of the MP process in the future.

### **Conclusion**

Much progress has been made in recent years in extending the MP concept and approach to a wider range of countries. Nonetheless, several key challenges remain. First, the geographical coverage of MPs remains uneven; in many regions of the world – such as Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, and most of Asia – few profiles have been prepared. Second, it is important to strengthen government ownership of the process and use of MPs, if they are to become a sustainable tool for policy development. It is important to link the preparation of an MP to a process of consultation with policymakers. Governments, in consultation with key stakeholders, should define the priorities, objectives and scope of a country profile. International agencies can support the process by providing technical assistance. Third, the elaboration of an MP should be a sustained activity. Migration Profiles need to be updated on a regular basis, that is, every second or third year. Governments should consider linking the preparation of an MP to a particular unit or ministry which would be given special responsibility for promoting the use of MPs by policymakers and programme managers, and ensuring that MPs are regularly updated.

**Figure 3: Migration Profile template – proposed structure**



**Table 1: Overview of Migration Profiles, 2005–2011**

Organization	Years	Countries covered	Description	Pros	Cons	Links
CARIM, with financial support from the EC	2009–2011	10 countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal and Tunisia.	Concise – max. 10-page overviews on migration, demographic, economic, legal and sociopolitical frameworks.	Concise presentation, comprehensive description.	Lack of government ownership, no capacity-building impact; mainly for migrant-sending countries.	<a href="http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=502">http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=502</a>
European Commission (EC)	2006–2011	> 80 countries: all African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, except Zimbabwe, and other developing countries where the EC supports aid programmes.	Annexes in country strategy papers (for the period 2008–2013), alongside other profiles, such as gender, environmental, governance profiles.	Concise presentation	Low capacity-building impact; mainly for migrant-sending countries; lack of government ownership.	For ACP countries: <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/methodologies/strategy papers10_en.cfm">http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/methodologies/strategy papers10_en.cfm</a>
		Potential EU candidate and EU candidate countries.	Extensive and country-owned reports with a focus on administrative data (border flows, irregular and return migration), as well as legislative framework and policies.	Government ownership; compatibility with EU acquis on migration statistics; regular updates.	No consideration of migration impact on development.	For Bosnia and Herzegovina: <a href="http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/?id=6158">http://www.msb.gov.ba/dokumenti/strateski/?id=6158</a>
HAMBURG INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, with support from the German Federal Agency for Civic Education	2007–2010	20 countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.	Comprehensive, primarily descriptive overviews, including historical and recent trends, policies, recommendations.	Comprehensive, for migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries.	Lack of government ownership; no capacity-building impact; complex presentation of main arguments.	<a href="http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Country-Profiles.1349.0.html?&amp;L=1">http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/Country-Profiles.1349.0.html?&amp;L=1</a>
ICMPD, with support from the EC and EU Member States	2009–2011	16 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia	Extensive country reports of 60–100 pages covering trends, policies and impact.	Comprehensive, with visual tools (graphs, tables)	Some government ownership, some capacity-building impact.	<a href="https://www.imap-migration.org">https://www.imap-migration.org</a>
IOM, with support from the EU, other donors and own resources	2006–2011	32 countries: 17 in Black Sea Region and Western Balkans; 10 in West and Central Africa; 4 in South America; Sudan.	Initially concise statistical reports prepared by experts, then extended migration profiles, which are comprehensive, focusing on capacity-building, consultation and government ownership.	Concise presentation, comprehensive, with government involvement; follow-up activities, some reports updated.	Little government support or sustainability in “standard profiles”; not very visual or user-friendly.	<a href="http://www.iom.ch/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/migration-profiles/cache/offonce/">http://www.iom.ch/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/migration-profiles/cache/offonce/</a>
World Bank		Eastern Europe and Central Asia	Migration and remittance profiles.	Concise presentation.	No government ownership.	<a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22471538~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258599,00.html">http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22471538~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258599,00.html</a>
UN DESA	1990, 2000	> 200 countries	Statistical snapshots of international migration.	Key statistics on common indicators.	Few indicators with no analysis; outdated data, limited to general international migration.	<a href="http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/locations/mainframecountries.htm">http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/locations/mainframecountries.htm</a>

Note: Overview based on available information as of 31 May 2011.