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Welcome to the ninth issue of *Migration Policy Practice*. This issue covers a range of policy areas, including migration and development, migration and climate change, assisted voluntary return and issues of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Haiti.

The first two articles, by Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje and by Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer, discuss a number of current issues in migration and development policy. Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), outlines Sweden’s priorities and proposals for the coming 18 months of the GFMD Chairmanship. She stresses that three significant processes will converge and have implications for how migration is addressed in the coming development agenda, namely: the second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013; the follow-up to the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in 2014; and the global preparations of the post-2015 development agenda. All three of these processes will provide an opportunity to contribute to greater convergence and policy coherence in the area of migration and development.

The second article, by Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer, reviews the current deliberations on a possible post-2015 global development framework. It also explores the question of how migration could feature in such a framework. The article stresses that international development policy debates have frequently failed to acknowledge that migratory choices of individuals to cross borders are often at least as important as the large conventional development interventions. A first option for a post-2015 global development framework would thus be to have a stand-alone goal related to migration with single targets and indicators. A second option would be to reflect separate (sub-)objectives for migrants and migrant populations under thematic development goals and targets such as health, gender, education or others. A third option would be to view international migration as a cross-cutting issue relevant for several aspects of development and requiring the mainstreaming of migration at various levels — locally, nationally and globally.

The third article, by Daria Mokhnacheva, Sieun Lee and Dina Ionesco, provides an overview of the role of migration policy in the context of climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) framework for climate change adaptation. It also examines developments at the eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 18), held in Doha in 2012, in relation to ‘loss and damage’ issues; and explains how the inclusion of migration matters in loss and damage raises challenges to and creates opportunities for advancing migration on the overall international climate change agenda.

The fourth article, by Liam Coakley, explores how asylum-seekers currently registered in Ireland’s ‘direct provision’ system feel about the prospect of assisted voluntary return to their country of origin. The article shows that migrants currently awaiting a decision on their application for refugee status in Ireland do not see voluntary return as an attractive option. Organizations active in the field of voluntary return should thus invest more time in trying to understand how asylum-seekers remember and imagine their ‘home’; how migrants construct allegiances while in their host country; and the importance of community-based allegiances with fellow migrants.

The last article, by Amy Rhoades and Leonard Doyle, discusses Project 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps in Haiti. This project, which began in October 2011 and is being implemented by IOM, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Office for Project Services and the United Nations Development Programme, under the guidance of the Government of Haiti, is a pilot scheme focused on giving rental subsidies to IDP families to facilitate the voluntary emptying of six large tent camps in Port-au-Prince and the return of IDPs to their 16 neighbourhoods of origin. Key to this intervention is the support given for the reintegration of IDPs by increasing their access to basic services and income-generating activities.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of *Migration Policy Practice* and encourage readers to contact us with suggestions for future articles.

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1 Solon Ardittis is Managing Director of Eurasylum Ltd and Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOM Headquarters in Geneva. They are co-editors of *Migration Policy Practice*.
Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development

Eva Åkerman Börje

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is a unique intergovernmental process that has annually gathered approximately 160 States since 2007. It was created after the 2006 United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development to fill a real need among governments and other stakeholders. It provides a platform to discuss measures to enhance the development impact of migration and mobility at global and national levels. The GFMD has addressed different aspects of migration, including ways to facilitate labour migration, mechanisms to lower the transaction costs for migration, safeguard migrants’ rights and enhance protection mechanisms. Closer collaboration with civil society, work with diaspora organizations and efforts to engage the private sector in development outcomes have further broadened the agenda to involve both State and non-State actors. An increasingly important complement to the State-led GFMD is the civil society-led process, which runs in parallel and culminates in a joint meeting with the States at the Common Space session of the Global Forum itself.

The GFMD has made an important contribution to greater cooperation between developing and developed countries. Recommendations stemming from the GFMD process have included formulating national policy and action plans to promote the synergies between migration and development. Efforts have included mainstreaming migration into development policies, with the ultimate goal of including migration in broader national development planning processes and in the formulation of country strategies for bilateral development cooperation.

Sweden holds the Chairmanship of the GFMD from January 2013 to June 2014, under the joint guidance of the Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy, Mr Tobias Billström, and the Minister for International Development Cooperation, Ms Gunilla Carlsson. The Chairmanship takes place at a significant point in time. A thorough assessment of the GFMD process took place in 2010–2012. It outlines the achievements of the first six years and offers recommendations aimed at realizing a common vision for the next phase. Sweden’s priorities and proposals for the coming 18 months build on the Forum’s gradual progress and achievements and are anchored in the recommendations of the Assessment Report. Sweden has three clear objectives: a more development-focused Forum, a more dynamic Forum, and a more durable Forum. Given the considerable impact of migration on development outcomes, a priority for Sweden is to strengthen the development dimension of the GFMD and the participation of development practitioners.

The coming two years mark an important period for the global debate on migration and development. During the Swedish Chairmanship, three significant processes converge which have implications for how migration is addressed in the coming development agenda, namely: the second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in the United Nations General Assembly in October 2013; the follow-up to the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development in 2014; and the global preparations of the post-2015 development agenda. All three of these processes provide an opportunity to contribute to greater convergence and policy coherence in the area of migration and development. Sweden, as the GFMD Chair, has an important role to play to promote a solid recognition of the contribution made by migration to realizing the current and future development goals. Linked to this is the need to include policy coherence in the policy discussions both at the national level and globally, as this is a key part of mainstreaming migration into the development agenda. A crucial step towards this goal is to encourage the engagement of development practitioners both in the State-led and the civil society part of the GFMD process.

Aspects of mobility discussed at the GFMD are highly relevant to many stakeholders who may address the causes and consequences of migration across a broad spectrum without actually focusing on migration as such, for example: investments in emerging markets, skills matching, job creation and entrepreneurship, women’s empowerment, integration, poverty alleviation, health and education. Understanding how mobility (whether by choice or necessity) affects other areas is important for the development and implementation of effective policies. The report Realizing the Future We Want for All lays the foundations for UN efforts to develop a new framework to build on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The report establishes that the key challenge for the UN post-2015 development agenda is ensuring

1 Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje is the Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development.
that globalization becomes a positive force for everyone in the world, both for current and future generations. Four key dimensions are highlighted: inclusive economic development, inclusive social development, peace and security, and environmentally sustainable development. In addition, the importance of a number of enablers of this development is noted. Migration, which is a concrete expression of globalization, is identified as one of the enablers of development. This enabler has huge development potential, for individual migrants and their families, for their country of origin and for the country of destination.

Since the MDGs were adopted in 2000, the global population has grown, primarily in low- and lower-middle-income countries, by 1 billion to a total of 7 billion. Every seventh person is a migrant, by virtue of having moved either outside their country of birth (214 million) or within their own country (750 million). This has also led to steady urbanization, with the result that more than half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas. It is estimated that 1 billion of these people live in slum areas. Around half of all migrants are women and their contribution to development, and their particular needs, have been acknowledged only in recent years. Population increases and migration have direct impacts on development. The positive aspects include a larger working population and higher growth, while the negative impacts include greater competition for scarce resources, leading to higher unemployment and social challenges. Global imbalances are reflected in large youth populations in low-income countries and a labour shortage in the majority of high-income countries due to ageing populations. These migration patterns contribute to increasing mutual dependence and a need for cooperation on global challenges in which the boundaries between traditional categories such as South/North and source/destination countries are becoming increasingly blurred.

The frequent view that migration is a matter of moving from one place to another, where the migrant settles permanently, has also proven increasingly inadequate to describe modern migration patterns. Circularity has increasingly set its stamp on migration. People move between countries, sometimes for longer periods and sometimes for shorter periods, and make significant contributions to development. Many population groups residing permanently outside their country of origin maintain connections and develop their contacts with that country. These diaspora groups often contribute actively to their countries of origin through transfer of knowledge and investments via their contacts and networks. When these countries of origin are low- or lower-middle-income countries, the contribution to reducing poverty can be considerable.

There are a number of concrete and potential enabling effects of migration on development. Migration has important effects on fundamental economic conditions related to labour markets, income levels, income distribution, financial markets, trade and investments. The primary means through which migration has an impact on such conditions include financial remittances, labour mobility and circular migration, transfer of skills and knowledge, and the international networks of migrants and diaspora, which facilitate trade and investment. Adequate legal frameworks for migration are often necessary to enable the positive outcomes and minimize the negative effects. In order to more systematically assess how such migration factors can enable development outcomes, they need to be better integrated into the broader development agenda.

Migration can contribute to poverty reduction and better access to education and health services. Migration can diversify household risks, can contribute to job creation and steady incomes for more people and can increase gender equality by enabling women to enter the labour market and become more self-reliant. The potential to attain a higher income through migration is also of great importance for social development. Remittances sent to family back home usually help to cover the daily consumption needs, which can in itself contribute to the MDG to eradicate poverty and hunger. Remittances are, in addition, often invested in health, education and accommodation. Such investments often come with important impacts on the MDGs linked to education and health. This has particularly been found to be the case in situations where women decide on the use of remittances. Sectors with critical skills shortages can benefit from the transfer of skills through circular migration and return (so-called ‘brain gain’ and ‘brain circulation’). The migration experience can empower women, both as individuals and as a group, by helping them to enter the labour market and earn higher incomes. The transfer of values and ideas brought about by migration (so-called ‘social remittances’) also means that migration can facilitate achieving the gender equality ambitions in the MDGs.

All of these are positive development outcomes. However, such positive outcomes are not automatic. There remain many downsides to migration, including social tensions within families and within societies. Migrants can be denied their rights. They can be abused and exploited by migrant smugglers, traffickers and unscrupulous employers, and exorbitant fees can reduce their potential savings and investments. Households can become dependent on foreign sources of income and less motivated to seek or prepare domestic opportunities. Policy frameworks may not be adapted to take full advantage of the potential of migrants to contribute to development. Governments, therefore, need to unlock the potential of migration for inclusive development. This is the overarching focus of the Swedish GFMD Chairmanship. Coherent development
policies that fully incorporate migration as an enabling factor are better equipped to maximize the benefits and minimize the downsides of migration. Governments that ensure the protection and empowerment of migrants can help them seek safe and gainful opportunities which also bring valuable development outcomes.

Sweden is interested in promoting inclusive economic development. Remittances, labour migration and circular forms of mobility, labour market matching and the diaspora networks that stimulate entrepreneurship, trade and investments can all contribute to positive development outcomes. Similarly, Sweden would like to highlight the importance of inclusive social development by improvements in the contribution of migration and remittances to education, health, job creation and gender relations. The empowerment of migrants, social protection and insurance are key issues in this regard that can unlock the positive effects on development.

The GFMD has established its value as a mechanism to develop trust and partnerships across national and functional boundaries. The Swedish Chair will continue to work closely with our government counterparts in the coming 18 months to ensure that the GFMD process can contribute substantially to ongoing policy debates on migration and development. Similarly, we will continue to engage with civil society to ensure a dialogue on areas of common interest and a close working relationship with the GFMD process globally and at the national level. It is our ambition that, as a result of our joint efforts, the effects of migration on the various development goals will be considered to a greater extent in the development surveys, analysis and strategies for different countries. It could also result in monitoring and evaluation clarifying to what extent or in what manner migration has contributed to the attainment of different development goals. Ultimately, it is by acknowledging the individual agency of each migrant, and the circumstances surrounding his or her mobility, that we can begin to develop policies and practice that will unlock the potential of migration for inclusive development.
Will a post-2015 development framework acknowledge migration?

Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer

International development policy is approaching a crossroads. With the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) framework expiring in 2015, the discussion on what could replace or refresh these goals has gained momentum. The deliberations on a possible post-2015 global development framework have already brought forward a range of elements to consider, many of which seeking to respond to perceived shortcomings of the existing MDGs.

Migration was not included in the original MDG framework, despite the references in the Millennium Declaration and clear – and at that time well-known – potential of migration for achieving the MDGs. There have been increasing calls for the next framework to go beyond the partial human development focus of the MDGs towards inclusive and sustainable development. In addition to substance, the means for the new framework should go beyond official development assistance and involve a broader set of instruments and development enablers (see EU, forthcoming; UN, 2012a, 2012b; Brandi, 2012; Jones, 2012). This article thus sets out to first present some compelling reasons why international migration is fundamentally linked to development and why mobility, especially opportunities and conditions for international labour migrants, should be part of a post-2015 global development framework. Subsequently, it will explore the question of how migration could feature in such a framework.

Globally, there are around 214 million international migrants, the great majority of which crossed international borders in search of better employment opportunities. About 70 per cent of total international migrants are born in the South (UNDESA, 2012).  

International migration is not restricted to people from low-income countries moving to high-income ones seeking work. South–South migration has been increasing and is believed to be as significant as South–North movements. While a considerable proportion of migration takes place within regions, the majority of migrants from the South have moved beyond their immediate region of birth (UNDESA, 2012). In addition, North–South migration, such as outflows of young Spanish and Portuguese migrants to Angola or Argentina, has increased following the deepening of Europe’s economic crisis, thus reversing the historical trend of labour flows between these countries, at least in the short term (Reuters, 2012; Lipczak, 2012).

Potentially larger benefits than from aid and free trade

International development policy debates frequently fail to acknowledge that migratory choices of individuals to cross borders are often at least as important as the large conventional development interventions. International mobility of people is often in itself part of the process of development for them and their families. People escape poverty as the very result of moving places (Clemens and Pritchett, 2008). Moreover, international labour migration plays an important role for the development of societies and countries. In Haiti, benefits from remittances sent home by migrants amount to nearly 20 per cent of GDP – more than twice the earnings from the country’s exports. Similarly, the reduction of income poverty in Nepal from 42 per cent to 26 per cent in 15 years was not mainly due to foreign direct investments, or to official development assistance, but rather to outward labour migration and remittances (EU, forthcoming; Adhikari and Sijapati, 2012).

Research has shown that there are enormous potential global economic gains from international movements of labour, but these are yet to be fully realized. As Clemens points out, the gains of substantially lowering barriers to labour migration have been estimated to range from 50 per cent to 150 per cent of world GDP (Clemens, 2011). For the citizens of poor countries, this could mean benefits of USD 305 billion a year – about twice as much as combining estimated annual gains from full trade liberalization, foreign aid and debt relief (Pritchett, 2006). Beyond the direct effects on poverty reduction, international migration and remittances have had positive effects on education, health and gender-equality (EU, forthcoming).

1 Anna Knoll is a Junior Policy Officer at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Niels Keijzer worked for the ECDPM as Deputy Programme Manager until December 2012 and is presently working as a researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE). This article is based on a shorter blog version: “Can we afford to ignore migration post-2015?”, ECDPM Talking Points, 27 July 2012, which is available from www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/can-we-afford-to-ignore-migration-post-2015/. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and should not be attributed to any other person or institution.

2 These numbers build on data of migrant stock and reflect only part of the picture of mobility as they do not capture short-term movement such as cross-border trade or seasonal labour migration which are equally relevant for development.
In countries of destination, labour migrants often perform important functions, fill skill gaps or labour shortages and thus contribute significantly to the economy. In Thailand, for example, the immigration of lower-skilled labour has contributed to GDP growth and Thai nationals were able to find better employment opportunities as immigrants have taken up the so-called ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’ jobs (Martin, 2007). In most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries “immigrants have made an important contribution to employment growth during the past decade” (OECD, 2009:12).

Yet, one cannot ignore that international migration may also entail negative implications, which need to be taken seriously and often require further policy actions to minimize them. Beyond the possible negative effects of brain drain and lost labour, recent research has looked at the complex social and psychological implications and effects on well-being. New social phenomena may be associated with high levels of emigration. In Nepal, for example, the predominance of male labour emigration has been affiliated with increasing divorce and elopement (EU, forthcoming). Other studies observe some negative effects on the psychological well-being of children because of the outward migration of their parents (Graham and Jordan, 2011). The social and economic impact of immigration in destination countries in the South as well as Northern countries shows a nuanced and strongly context-dependent picture. While many empirical studies observe an economic net benefit for countries of destination, these benefits may not be equally distributed and some particular groups in society may be disadvantaged in the short term (EU, forthcoming). In addition, some concerns have been raised about negative socioeconomic effects, including the deterioration of social cohesion, xenophobic tendencies and strains on the capacity of receiving developing countries to provide additional services to immigrants (such as health care) or to put in place integration policies.

As the developmental gains of international migration are arguably enormous and labour migration mostly constitutes choices individuals make, the negative effects of international migration should not be countered by introducing restrictions. The best policy response should rather be to take emerging phenomena, such as children with migrant parents, into account and design policies to respond to them adequately to minimize negative effects.

Looking ahead – the implications of trends beyond 2015

There are good reasons to assume that pressures on worldwide labour migration flows will rise in the future. Demographic developments in the upcoming decades are characterized by growing labour forces in developing countries (increasing from 2.4 billion to 3.6 billion in 2040). This may result in rising unemployment within these countries and contribute to widening gaps in economic opportunities available to populations of richer and poorer countries. The result will be a growing demand for access to labour markets in countries with better opportunities (Koser, 2010).

Parallel to the growth of the labour force in some developing countries, a growing number of developed, developing and emerging countries are experiencing population ageing and declining workforces. Countries that are currently poor but on a development path may in the future compete for labour with today’s richer countries. China, for example, is soon likely to aspire to attract international labour migrants against the background of its ageing and declining workforce while its economy is growing (Bruni, 2011). In OECD countries, the positive role of migration in maintaining the size of the labour force is expected to become more important in the future, especially in the European Union (OECD, 2012). Moreover, climate change and the disruption of livelihoods dependent on ecosystems will force workers to search for employment abroad and will thus be another driver of migration in the decades to come. This is why migration as a development issue is not only relevant in discussions on a post-2015 framework, but also in the ongoing negotiations on the Sustainable Development Goals which the Rio+20 outcome document linked to the post-2015 discussions.

The role of migration in a post-2015 agenda

Although in terms of substance the case for including migration in a post-2015 framework is strong, it is less clear how this could be done in a meaningful way. The likelihood of this taking place depends on the course of the overall discussions on the post-2015 agenda; whether a new agenda will focus on poverty eradication or a broader vision of inclusive and sustainable development; and whether it will apply to all countries or focus mainly on the poorest. One should not, however, regress to a passive mode by waiting to see whether migration could be ‘accommodated’, as migration can play a strong role in determining the outcome of the overall direction and vision of the framework. Depending on the direction chosen, a number of complementary options can be identified as to how migration can feature in a post-2015 agenda.

A first option is to have a stand-alone goal related to migration with single targets and indicators. This would certainly give prominence to the contribution of migration to poverty reduction and development. Following the language of the United Nations (UN), such a goal could be about “enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative implications” (UN, 2012b). This is still a
broad formulation and adequate targets and indicators would need to be identified. While one could imagine having targets such as reducing the costs of migration, admitting a certain number or quota of international migrants or ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted in 1990, ratified by 46 countries as of 2012) and the International Labour Organization Conventions concerning migrant workers (Convention Nos. 97 and 143), it is less clear how exactly the achievement of such migration targets as ends in themselves relates to the improvement of the developmental impact of migration. Measuring this link would require further measurement evaluation and monitoring and makes the task overly complex. Moreover there could be a risk that the post-2015 agenda will become overloaded with too many other stand-alone goals, which would compromise the clarity and focus of the framework, which has been one of the MDGs’ main strengths.

A second option would be to reflect separate (sub-)objectives for migrants and migrant populations under thematic development goals and targets such as health, gender, education or others. This seems a feasible option in the context of fighting inequalities that were given attention in the MDGs. Focusing on vulnerable groups, such as migrants, and measuring their progress with regard to certain goals would be a step in the right direction in reducing inequalities. Yet, while perhaps improving the situation of migrants in certain areas, such a link would neglect many aspects of the interrelation between migration and development which could be positively harnessed for development.

The United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda has proposed a third option, which is to view migration and fair rules of migration governance as a key enabler for development. Such an option views international migration as a cross-cutting issue relevant for several aspects of development and requires the mainstreaming of migration at various levels – locally, nationally and globally. In concrete terms, this means that, when focusing on achieving a certain goal, the potential contribution of international migration and the possible constraint posed by such mobility towards that goal would be taken into account when designing policy strategies. Such an approach does most justice to the fact that international migration is relevant for a wide range of development factors (UN, 2012a) and that its developmental impact much depends on the context. However, this approach also may ‘awaystream’ international migration if there are no clear goals and targets designed to monitor progress of such a commitment. Furthermore, as for other mainstreaming goals, the institutional mechanisms for such an approach would need to be in place, as this requires the capacity to coordinate between various units, ministries and different dossiers. This holds not only at the national level, but also for the UN family where the Global Migration Group – an effort to bring various UN agencies together to coherently work on migration and development – has not fully achieved the level of coordination necessary for a serious mainstreaming (see Newland, 2010; Betts, 2010).

A combination of the three options presented here, namely having a specific goal, making other goals migration-sensitive or mainstreaming migration, would provide for a compelling fourth option: An MDG8-type goal of a global partnership on international migration. In the spirit of going beyond aid, this would include a stepping-up of the policy coherence for development commitments made (e.g. during the 2010 United Nations High-level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals) with regard to international migration. Global partnerships could, for example, explore possibilities to better match labour migrants with labour market needs on an international scale (EU, forthcoming), conclude new and more predictable labour migration and mobility schemes, push for a rights-based agenda for migrants, implement the “5x5” objective for remittances, link mobility opportunities to disaster risk reduction for vulnerable countries (Murray and Williamson, 2011) and integrate civil society, migrant associations and the private sector in those partnerships. The Global Forum on Migration and Development and the UN governance on migration and development issues could be strengthened in this context. The crucial challenge here is the degree to which governments are prepared to form global partnerships, what type of partnerships will realistically emerge and, equally important, to ensure that government’s will live up to their commitments. After all, MDG8 on developing a global partnership for development was widely seen as one of the goals against which there has been least progress and even a backsliding (UN, 2012c).

The way forward

Despite the promising references on migration in the United Nations System Task Team report on the post-2015 agenda, improving opportunities and conditions for labour migrants is still, however, far from being at the top of the development agenda (Green, 2012). With the political sensitivities surrounding it, particularly but not only among OECD members, we may once again observe that policymakers prefer not to factor international migration explicitly into a new global framework on development. Despite the potential of international migration for development and the reduction of global inequalities, in the last couple of years, changes in immigration policies of receiving countries, especially in the North – but increasingly in the South – have restricted labour mobility and, at times, the rights enjoyed by migrants. Costs for those willing to migrate remain high and the conditions in which migrant workers live are frequently characterized...
by hazardous work environments, discrimination and insecurity.

Aware of the difficulties of negotiations on international migration, some argue that it is politically unfeasible and too contentious to have international migration included under the present circumstances and in view of the tight negotiation framework. Yet, the question is whether a meaningful development agenda can really ignore issues of such fundamental relevance to development. The development community should keep in mind that the volume of remittances by far exceeds official development assistance flows and that migration is relevant for a wide range of development goals. For politicians in developed countries, it may become increasingly costly to ignore the fact that labour immigrants will be needed in the future to sustain economic activity on current levels; for this reason, migration can be a key component of a truly ‘global framework’ for post-2015 – possibly including the Sustainable Development Goals. Moreover, even modest changes in countries’ immigration policies can have a huge impact on people in poor countries, without bearing substantial political risk at home (Barder, 2012).

While the preparations for the post-2015 agenda provide an opportunity to raise awareness and bring attention to the outlined issues, those working towards advancing the migration and development nexus at the international level need to take into account current realities and carefully think about strategies of engagement in order to identify the politically sensitive debates and ensure greater commitment to the mainstreaming agenda. Perhaps more research is required on the political economy of migration and development policies and incentive mechanisms in order to break the current deadlocks through politically acceptable solutions.3

This calls for going ‘beyond aid’ and focusing on other means to achieve development goals. International migration does and will continue to have a significant positive impact on poverty reduction and development – an impact that any meaningful post-2015 development framework and true global partnerships should no longer ignore.

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3 A recent paper by de la Croix and Docquier explores such incentive mechanisms. While still being a rather theoretical analysis, such research can provide insights for practical translation (see de la Croix and Docquier, 2013).

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Introduction

The linkages between migration, the environment and climate change have received increasing international attention in recent years. The migration–environment nexus has been discussed in diverse contexts – human security, disaster risk reduction, human rights and development – yet surprisingly has not been given enough attention at international negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Migration was mentioned for the first time in the climate change negotiation texts in 2010, 18 years after the negotiations began.

Countries agreed upon the UNFCCC in 1992 as a means to limit the rising global temperature by reducing emissions and to provide means to cope with the adverse effects of climate change. The impacts of climate change on livelihoods have significant implications for forced migration; simultaneously, migration can be a way for the most vulnerable populations to adapt to negative environmental changes. Human mobility is one of the many dimensions of climate change which must gain greater preponderance in the climate change negotiations. The topic is undoubtedly gaining increased interest at the policy, research, media and general public levels, directly benefiting from a greater awareness of the overall social and human dimensions of climate change.

Climate change is about people’s choices as much as about their lack of opportunities to choose. Considering migration in the climate change context is a matter of ensuring that safe, voluntary and well-planned migration can be an option, and that people who do not want to move from regions affected by climate change have access to alternative livelihoods and solutions to adapt to their changing surroundings.

This article first provides a brief review of where migration currently stands in the context of climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC framework for climate change adaptation. Second, and as a main focus, the article examines developments at the eighteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 18), held in Doha in November 2012, in relation to ‘loss and damage’ issues. The article explores how migration and loss and damage concepts interrelate; and explains how the inclusion of migration in loss and damage issues raises challenges to and creates opportunities for advancing migration on the overall international climate change agenda.

Doha: Limited advancement on migration in adaptation plans

Migration was formally introduced to the negotiation text in 2010 in the agreements reached at the sixteenth session of the Conference of Parties (COP 16), held in Cancun, Mexico. Paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Agreements calls for Parties to take “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels” to enhance action on adaptation. This anchored migration in the text, acknowledging the relation between migration and climate change adaptation and providing common ground for discussion.

In the last two years, at COP 17 in Durban (2011) and COP 18, negotiations continued on improving adaptation planning efforts and strengthening the adaptive capacities of the most vulnerable countries in the medium term and long term. National adaptation plans can be an appropriate tool to integrate migration concerns into adaptation planning, and, as agreed in Durban, the Green Climate Fund would fund adaptation, thus making activities under the aforementioned paragraph 14(f) eligible for funding. However, COP 18 concluded with no advancement on this paragraph, thus reflecting that, while human mobility and the social dimensions of climate change are gaining greater visibility, migration must be advocated to increase

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1 This article was produced by Daria Mokhnacheva (IOM Project Support Officer, specializing in migration and loss and damage) and Sieun Lee (IOM Junior Research Officer, specializing in migration and adaptation), and coordinated with Dina Ionesco (IOM Policy Officer, specializing in migration, environment and climate change).

2 For the full text, see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4.

its mainstreaming into climate change adaptation strategies.

The IOM side event at COP 18, entitled How to Integrate Migration into Adaptation Strategies and Planning,4 provided a forum to discuss the evidence on the link between migration and adaptation and how to directly implement the aforementioned paragraph 14(f). At this event, it was clearly reconfirmed that, although migration in the context of climate change is a complex phenomenon, if planned thoroughly and in advance, migration can be an adaptation strategy to reduce vulnerabilities of populations, and that environmental migration should be considered in the broad context of migration management policies. Another important point made was that the ever-increasing number of publications which has strengthened the evidence base must be promoted and shared to inform policymakers and influence decision-making and to raise the profile of migration in adaptation frameworks.

Doha: Progress in integrating migration in loss and damage issues

One of the notable achievements of COP 18 was the progress made on the issue of ‘loss and damage’, another area where considerable attention should be given to migration.

A relatively recent topic on the climate change agenda, loss and damage was formally mentioned for the first time within the UNFCCC framework at the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13), held in Bali in 2007.5 A work programme on loss and damage was then established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, and further strengthened at COP 17 in Durban, with the objective of improving the understanding of loss and damage associated with climate change in vulnerable developing countries. The work programme established the basis for a series of workshops and meetings to prepare recommendations for COP 18 along three thematic areas: assessing risk, exploring existing and potential approaches to address loss and damage, and determining the role of the UNFCCC in this context. The scope and definition of the concept were thus developed and refined at expert meetings in the lead-up to COP 18 in 2012.

The Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, set up by the Government of Bangladesh – which has been responsible for the loss and damage negotiation process since 2011 – generally defined loss and damage as “the actual and/or potential manifestation of climate impacts that negatively affect human and natural systems”, which can either be repaired (damage) or not (loss).6 As such, the introduction of this concept into the negotiations is an acknowledgment by the international community that mitigation and adaptation efforts alone are not enough to prevent all the negative effects of climate change on society and the environment. Therefore, the negative outcomes will have to be addressed and managed. Discussions at expert meetings at the beginning of 2012, which focused on definitions and conceptualization, further clarified the scope of climate impacts, with a general consensus to include both sudden- and slow-onset events. The importance of acknowledging non-economic losses and damage was also emphasized, thus introducing ecological, social and cultural aspects into the agenda alongside economic aspects.

Despite the progress made throughout 2012 in assessing and understanding this topic, the decision adopted at COP 18 pointed to the need for further research and work to enhance the understanding of loss and damage.7 The concept thus still offers some flexibility in terms of definition and interpretation, as member countries and other key stakeholders continue to explore the subject.

Meanwhile, the current understanding of loss and damage and the present working context provide a clear opportunity to advance migration on the international climate change agenda.

Linking the two: impacts of loss and damage on migration

The interpretation of the link between migration and loss and damage is manifold. Perhaps the most evident aspect of this nexus is the impact of loss and damage on human mobility. On the one hand, loss and damage can cause migration: loss of arable land caused by desertification or soil degradation – or long-term damage to the agricultural potential caused by floods or droughts – can, for example, force farmers to migrate to cities in search of alternative sources of income. Loss of habitable land, for example on small islands exposed to

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4 For information on the side event, the publications launched in Doha and key messages, see www.iom.int/cms/climateandmigration.

5 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(iii), requests Parties to explore “means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1).

6 Definition given by the Loss and Damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative, as cited by the Climate and Development Knowledge Network (see http://cdkn.org/2012/09/loss-and-damage-from-defining-to-understanding-to-action/?loclang=en_gb).

7 Paragraph 7 of Draft decision /CP.18: Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity. Available from http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/doha_nov_2012/decisions/application/pdf/cmp8_lossanddamage.pdf.
sea-level rise or in coastal areas suffering from erosion, inevitably forces people to move to other areas. These are just a few examples of economic or environmental loss and damage which are likely to cause migration.

On the other hand, loss and damage may have the opposite effect on mobility, leaving people without the means to adopt migration as an adaptation or even survival strategy, or to move to less vulnerable areas. For instance, poor households in areas prone to sudden-onset disasters or slow-onset environmental degradation may be trapped as the degradation of environmental conditions destroys their assets. The number of such ‘trapped’ people is in fact expected to increase in the future,8 and their inability to migrate will most likely result in further loss and damage to these vulnerable households and to communities at large, unless efforts are made locally to adapt to climate change, diversify incomes and reduce dependency on the environment.

Migration through the lens of loss and damage

The likelihood of increased loss and damage in the context of trapped populations does not, however, mean that migration automatically prevents loss and damage. In fact, another way to consider the connection between migration and loss and damage is to consider loss and damage resulting from migration induced by climate change. Forced, unprepared migration resulting from sudden negative effects of climate change (such as destructive cyclones or flash floods) may entail permanent abandonment (and therefore loss) of immovable property and assets, loss of jobs and sources of income, and disruption of social ties at the household or individual level.

At a broader community level, sudden, unmanaged mass population outflows may lead to short- or long-term economic, social and cultural losses, and more broadly to loss and damage in terms of development. More concretely, migration-induced loss and damage may take several forms, such as economic decline due to outflows of human capital, weakening of social support networks, or potential disruption of basic services such as education or health. In addition, because forced displacement is inevitably an undesirable outcome, it could even be considered in itself as a type of social, economic and even cultural loss or damage to local and national economic and social systems, and to the communities left behind.

Accordingly, if we approach this question from the opposite angle, preventing forced migration induced by climate change, assisting and protecting forced migrants and facilitating migration for trapped populations and vulnerable communities at large are examples of positive adaptation strategies that could contribute to preventing or reducing loss and damage. In more practical terms, there is a need to frame forced migration as a type of loss and damage and to design approaches, policies, institutional arrangements and financial mechanisms to prevent forced migration, assist preventive and adaptive migration and provide insurance solutions and compensation mechanisms for the loss and damage incurred by individuals, communities or governments if forced migration takes place.

Still a long way ahead

COP 18 fully recognized, for the first time, the need for enhanced action to address loss and damage resulting from the adverse impacts of climate change, including the provision of financial support to affected developing countries by developed countries, and the establishment of relevant institutional arrangements at COP 19.9 This could have very tangible implications for the efforts to address climate-induced migration, provided that migration, and displacement in particular, is recognized fully within the loss and damage framework.

Despite the fact that many affected countries (particularly least developed countries) and specialized organizations (such as IOM, the United Nations University, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)10 have stressed the importance of addressing migration and displacement within the loss and damage agenda, efforts to include the topic in the negotiations have been only partially successful and progress is slow in this area. Although migration was initially mentioned seven times in the COP 18 negotiation texts, the topic was brought down to a single paragraph in the final decision, which acknowledged the need to study the subject further:11 While this is certainly a positive and encouraging sign, it is also an indication that migration

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9 See Draft decision -/CP.18: Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity.


11 See paragraph 7(a)(v) of Draft decision -/CP.18: Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance adaptive capacity, which acknowledges the further work for “Enhancing the understanding of: ... How impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility”.

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is still not seen as an area of priority in global efforts and action for adaptation to climate change. Hence, this calls for more evidence and a better understanding of migration in the context of climate change with regard to loss and damage in particular.

**Conclusion**

Parties adopted the “Doha Climate Gateway” at the end of COP 18 which includes agreements on a new commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, a work plan to adopt a universal climate agreement by 2015, scaled-up finance and a pathway to raise ambitions for action to reduce the adverse effects of climate change and to push for greater international cooperation.

Challenges still lie ahead in terms of mainstreaming migration into the climate change adaptation plans at the local, national and international levels and for the further advancement of migration in the context of adaptation or loss and damage, especially in terms of funding. The establishment of the new funding mechanism, the Green Climate Fund, holds some promise for securing financial commitments from developed countries to be channelled into migration-related adaptation projects in developing countries as funding opportunities remain limited in the Adaptation Fund. The agreement on the Green Climate Fund specifies that a considerable amount of the new multilateral funding will be made available for adaptation projects, programmes and policies using thematic funding windows, which could create opportunities for migration projects in the near future.12

Although migration has just crossed the starting line at the climate change talks, with the advancement of the migration agenda on loss and damage we can expect Parties to raise migration and discuss its implications and the opportunities it presents. Further delay in solution design and action in this area may result in greater loss and damage for society in economic, social and development terms.

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Ideas of ‘home’ and ‘return home’ in voluntary return messaging – A contemplation on the impact of passage of time and sense of failure on asylum-seekers’ engagements with voluntary return in Ireland

Liam Coakley

Introduction

While the number of migrants applying for refugee status in Ireland has declined significantly since the high point reached in 2002, the number of asylum-seekers still housed in Ireland’s network of ‘direct provision’ accommodation centres was 4,750 at the end of 2012. For some, this period of their lives will end in success and they will be granted the right to live and work in Ireland. For the majority, however, their applications will end in failure. Success rates among those seeking refugee status in Ireland are very low.

Ireland’s final sanction against these ‘failed’ asylum-seekers is deportation. Historically, Ireland has not deported significant numbers of immigrants. Only 298 ‘failed’ asylum-seekers were deported to their country of origin in 2012, with a further 120 or so being deported to their country of origin on the basis of European Union (EU) removal orders or to another EU State under the Dublin II Regulation. However, as with direct provision, this process is seen to be essential to the continued integrity of Ireland’s immigration system and is likely to remain in place. Indeed, as recently as 2 January 2013, Alan Shatter, Ireland’s Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, called for an increased emphasis to be placed on the effective enforcement of deportation orders in 2013.

This article draws on data produced during a recent research project (Coakley, 2011) that sought to explore how asylum-seekers currently in Ireland’s direct provision system feel about the prospect of assisted voluntary return to and reintegration in their country of origin – an option offered to asylum-seekers, as long as they are not already in receipt of a deportation order, and favoured by successive Irish Governments as a humane and cost-effective alternative to forced repatriation. This research was commissioned by the International Organization for Migration’s Dublin office (IOM Dublin) and funded by the European Return Fund and the Department of Justice and Equality of the Government of Ireland.

Although this research is partial, it demonstrates that migrants awaiting a decision on their application for refugee status in Ireland do not see voluntary return as an attractive option. Rather, the vast majority prefer to remain resident in Ireland, in the hope of achieving a positive outcome to their application, at some future point – an outcome that seems unlikely, for most. A majority of asylum-seekers simply do not engage with the idea of voluntary return until it is too late and they have already received a deportation order.

IOM Dublin is active and effective in this field, but one organization can only do so much. There is a clear need for significantly increased cooperation from all other stakeholders active in the Irish migration landscape. This is unlikely to happen, however. Elements of the non-governmental immigrant advocacy sector have been particularly slow to engage with the idea of return.

There is a consequent clear need for stakeholders in the assisted voluntary return and reintegration process to maximize the effectiveness of their primary messaging so that all potential beneficiaries are informed about the benefits that can accrue for them and so that the potential for misinformation is minimized. This article considers the effectiveness of one particular aspect of this messaging process – the conceptualization of voluntary return as a mechanism by which asylum-seekers can ‘return home’. Data from the recent project are drawn upon and learning is shared in the hope of contributing to the continuing formulation of effective return policies at the international level.

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1 Liam Coakley is Programme Coordinator of the Masters in Contemporary Migration and Diaspora Studies, at University College Cork, Ireland.


3 Ibid.

4 IOM Dublin has hosted a range of different return programmes over the 10 years since their inception in 2001. Return destinations ebb and flow, with some countries of origin being more visible in some years than in others (see Quinn, 2009:16), but migrants who have availed themselves of this service have mostly returned to locations in Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and South America.
Specifically, I argue that it is unadvisable to present assisted voluntary return as an opportunity to return home, as many potential beneficiaries of such programmes no longer have the same affinity with home they had when they left. It is particularly erroneous to conceptualize return as a method of cancelling the displacement brought about by migration as, in many instances, a migrant’s place of origin may no longer be desirable to him or her. This can be especially pertinent in situations where, as Sward states (2009:3), potential returnees may face discrimination as a result of their return status. Many asylum-seekers simply have no clear understanding of where home is and what home means. This is because they have moved and have changed and, for them, ‘home’ has changed as well.

In support of this contention, the below sections present two short empirical examples from Ireland: (a) consideration of the impact of the passage of time on an asylum-seeker’s sense of home; and (b) consideration of the impact of a migrant’s potential sense of failure.

Passage of time undermines the connection asylum-seekers have with their original ‘home place’

Asylum-seekers can spend many years subject to the workings of Ireland’s assessment process. People simply move on and change over this space of time and this results in a loss of connection with their country of origin.

In this interview excerpt, Nick, an asylum-seeker from West Africa, demonstrates that he still identifies with his birth country’s heritage. However, the experience of life in Ireland has changed his outlook. In this way, the thought of return home is alien to him. He states:

You have seen the outside world and you have seen a different thing, so to you and somebody like me, who thinks, who looks at things and says no, no, no. It is not going to be right in this way and becoming very exposed for me. When I read the [country of origin] news I do act up. I say, look this is not the way it is supposed to. We have seen this thing. The outside world. How it works. How can’t it work in this way. I get very agitated, very angry looking at this. Why can’t it be. I pray that this is not the way that it should go.

This is a common and important experience. In this light, it is reasonable for Black and Gent (2006:20) to state that it is inherently mistaken to conceptualize return as a process that re-establishes equilibrium in the system by taking someone who is out of place in their host society and returning them home to their rightful country. While the asylum-seekers who participated in this research may indeed be experiencing difficulties in Ireland, they are equally experiencing a loss of connection with the specificities of life in their country of origin.

The way in which Ghanem (2003:15) addresses the psychosocial aspects of return supports this analysis when she calls into question the validity of conceptualizations that seek to posit the return process in terms of repatriation ‘home’. Although national identity can be a very powerful connection to a past life when living as a migrant, in many instances migrants develop different expectations while they are away. As Nick goes on to state: “One day you are out from that country and coming out to this place – your life has changed.”

In this regard, ideas of home and belonging are best not seen as static or universal in nature but rather contested and multiple (e.g. Bialczyk, 2008:12) and liable to change over time in response to new experiences and understanding. Migrants seeking international protection fully orientate themselves and their aspirations to life in their host country and may indeed come to see their country of origin as a foreign place irrespective of the exact nature of their status, or their likely success in being granted refugee status. Carol, a focus group participant from West Africa, certainly posits her reluctance to think about return in these terms when she states: “What do I have, what do I have? I’ve lost all the connection to home.” In many such instances, articulations of home simply do not resonate with the individuals concerned, and return messages that harness such articulations inevitably fall on deaf ears.

A sense of failure discourages people from re-engaging with their ‘home place’

Many people struggle with ideas of success and failure. The fact that they have been resident in a Western context, often for a prolonged period of time, and have not achieved what they hoped for, weighs on many migrants’ minds. Many participants in Ireland’s assisted voluntary return and reintegration research particularly worry about how they will be perceived should they arrive back home. The thought of going home empty-handed features in many narratives. Feelings of failure and shame are common, as the migrant anticipates a loss of self during the return process because of his or her lack of economic success being mapped onto his or her sense of self-worth. Eddie, a participant from West Africa, makes the following illustrative statement in this regard:

To go back is a failure and a shame on the whole family. If you tell them that things are not going well they wouldn’t believe you. The accusation of being lazy is...
a big thing. They can only go home dead. They don’t want to feel the shame. There are families that have sold everything, their house, to ensure that the person gets to Europe. They are investing in that person so that they’re even a pressure. They will only accept return if they have exhausted every other possibility.

This potential sense of failure can be further exacerbated in instances where a migrant may have borrowed money to fund his or her movement. Some people simply cannot return to their country of origin because they do not have the money to repay the debts they incurred in coming to Ireland. Jack, an experienced plumber from Nigeria, is one such person. Despite stating that he cannot go home to Nigeria because of fear of violence, Jack speaks strongly about his need to stay in Ireland so that he can repay his debt. He states: “Me and my wife cost me EUR 14,000 to come here. A lot of money. A big money. I took a loan from the bank. We feel bad. That is why we are still waiting, maybe we will work and start to pay our money.” Interestingly, he ends rather lamely by stating “I cannot go back because of the political problem as well.” It is a matter of course that many migrants utilize an agent to facilitate their movement from their sending country to their destination country. Sums of many thousands of dollars regularly change hands in such transactions. This will inevitably add a further layer of difficulty, and immigrants contemplating return may very well be prompted to remain in their destination country rather than return to face a significant debt, even one which is most likely owed to a close family member or blood relative (e.g. Strand et al., 2008). As Ruben, Van Houte and Davids succinctly state (2009:908): “Return migration is not always a process of going home.”

Discussion

Ideas of ‘home’ and ‘return home’ can have a role to play in the operationalization of assisted voluntary return but – in light of the data uncovered during the Irish research – only if such concepts are presented in a manner that is significantly more nuanced than statements to the effect that return will automatically facilitate the migrant’s re-engagement with home.

Ultimately, assisted voluntary return and reintegration messaging needs to be presented in innovative terms. Contrary to many current patterns, return home should not be presented as a closing of the circle – as though return represents a normal course of action in the event of difficulties being encountered during a migratory experience, or as though return represents a return to equilibrium in the migrant’s life, after a period of instability caused by migration. This construction simply does not take account of the fact that, for many, time has moved on; they have changed and their social and economic networks in their country of origin have almost certainly changed as well. While people would like to think that they could reintegrate easily, most appreciate that this will be a very difficult thing to do. In this regard, presenting return as a natural closure is insulting to the intelligent migrant, and it does not work. Migrants know that return is not an easy prospect and, contrary to much current operational literature, that it represents their failure to settle in a Western context. This will especially be the case for the economic path-finding migrant or economic migrant who has migrated as part of a family or community resource strategy.

The idea of return home is probably not problematic in itself. Difficulties arise from what going back home represents, namely failure. This is a powerful element. Not only in itself, but also because of the relationship it has with the original impulse to leave. Migrants leave for a better life. To return is to admit that they have not been successful; therefore, to go back is considered as going back to a poorer life. It is very important therefore that assisted voluntary return and reintegration messaging should break this binary opposition inherent in many migration biographies. Specifically, organizations active in this area and charged with the operationalization of assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes must counter the paired idea that people migrate in the hope of a better life, and that to return therefore equates with an acceptance of going back to a worse life.

To do this, a more proactive conceptualization of return is needed. Simply inviting asylum-seekers to go home, where life will be good again (because it is home) presents far too facile a picture here. Rather, organizations active in this area need to present an image of the individual’s ability to succeed at home – as opposed to the likelihood of continued difficulty as an asylum-seeker. In this regard, return home should not be presented as a return to the default setting, but rather as something new that holds opportunities for the individual (a new phase of a person’s migratory experience maybe). Key to the delivery of this message is to understand what asylum-seekers need and how to encourage them to engage with the idea of return through this filter, not simply through the use of a passive catchphrase.

Conclusions

Far too high a proportion of the asylum-seekers who participated in this research are living an institutionalized existence. The vast majority focus on their hopes for a life in Ireland and are very closed to the prospect of voluntary return to their country of origin. Increased outreach and more proactive information provision are needed at every level of the migration management process. There is a clear need to educate migrants about the full range of options available to them.

Specialist service providers, such as IOM, can only do so much. A far wider ranging engagement with the idea of return is needed. Migrant advocacy organizations have a strong role to play here as well. There is a sense that
many of these organizations do not fully embrace the idea of return to a country of origin or the fact that oftentimes return represents a viable option for an individual. A more integrated engagement with return, based on the principles of partnership, would constitute a useful development for all in this regard.

In all this, however, conceptualizations of ‘return home’ need to be nuanced. Specifically, to be effective, those charged with the presentation of return need to examine how migrants actually see themselves vis-à-vis their country of origin. It would be pointless to talk of home or even of national community groups to people who may not actually engage with the idea of home at all. To do this (and therefore to find out about the internalization of home), organizations active in this area need to invest time in trying to understand: (a) how asylum-seekers remember and imagine their home; (b) how migrants construct allegiances while in their host country (e.g. are national diasporic allegiances important?); and (c) if community-based allegiances with fellow migrants are important.

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Rebuilding lives and livelihoods: Haiti’s long road to recovery through skills development and training for internally displaced persons

Amy Rhoades and Leonard Doyle

Out of the rubble and destruction created by the devastating earthquake of January 2010 in Haiti, young internally displaced persons (IDPs) are being given an opportunity to start afresh through targeted skills development and training programmes. For many, this is their first time inside a classroom. While this intervention has offered a lifeline to IDPs who have been languishing for over two years in tent camps across Port-au-Prince, far more are leaving the camps without the resources and skills necessary to rebuild their lives, their communities and their country. The need to expand training and livelihood programmes in the wake of disaster is imperative for long-term recovery.

A country’s most important resource is not its raw materials or its geographical location but the skills of its people. (UNESCO, 2010)

In October 2012, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) released the Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2012: Youth and skills: Putting education to work. This annual report assesses the global progress made towards the six goals within the Education for All (EFA) mandate. For the first time since the establishment of the EFA goals in 2000, this report focuses on goal 3 of the EFA mandate which relates to promoting learning and life skills for young people and adults. However, the results are discouraging; an overall summary of goal 3 suggests that few gains have been made. The UNESCO report notes that: “[goal 3] has not received the attention it deserves from governments, aid donors, the education community or the private sector – and it is now more critical than ever.” (UNESCO, 2012). This is particularly true in emergency response despite its importance for sustainable recovery and economic resilience.

While it is encouraging to see policy being followed by practice in an emergency, UNESCO’s assertion that: “[Education] is therefore now seen as the fourth pillar of humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict and of natural disasters, alongside nourishment, health services and shelter” (UNESCO, 2003) remains a work in progress.

Currently, the bulk of educational humanitarian assistance is directed towards primary education as reflected in both political priorities and resource allocation. A survey conducted by the Women’s Refugee Commission found that education programmes beyond the primary level are few and far between in emergency response and recovery (Women’s Refugee Commission, 2007). However, considering the rising rates of youth unemployment, the huge costs to society and the economy resulting from an unskilled labour force, and the high rate of return on resources allocated to youth training, incorporating skills development programmes as a central tenet of humanitarian assistance is a wise investment. This attention is particularly relevant for adolescent and youth IDPs, many of whom have not been afforded adequate educational opportunities at a young age.

Project 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps

As a result of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, over 200,000 people were killed and another 1.5 million were left homeless. Not only did people lose their homes and livelihoods, but in many cases schools were also destroyed. According to government estimates, in the eastern region of Haiti, which comprises more than half of the school facilities nationwide, over 80 per cent of schools were destroyed or seriously damaged. Technical and vocational education and training facilities were also hard hit, with 8 out of 9 public training institutions and all 11 of the private training institutions being either destroyed or seriously damaged. In total, 4,268 school

1 Amy Rhoades is a consultant with the International Labour Organization in Hispaniola and Leonard Doyle is Head of the Online Communications Unit at the International Organization for Migration in the Philippines. Parts of this article are extracted from Rhoades’ research paper entitled Displaced futures: Internally displaced persons and the right to education, available from www.right-to-education.org/sites/r2e.gn.apc.org/files/displaced_futures.pdf.

2 The six EFA goals established at the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000 covered the following: (1) expanding early childhood care and education; (2) providing free and compulsory primary education for all; (3) promoting learning and life skills for young people and adults; (4) increasing adult literacy by 50 per cent; (5) achieving gender parity by 2005 and gender equality by 2015; and (6) improving the quality of education.

3 Education beyond the primary level is referred to in Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights elaborates on this provision in General Comment 13, noting that secondary education and technical and vocational education form part of the right to education as they are considered “the foundations for life-long learning and human development” and should be extended to those who have not had adequate educational opportunities (document E/C.12/1999/10).
Eighteen months later, as a result of political and policy paralysis, an estimated 634,000 people were still internally displaced, living in tent camps throughout the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Out of this emerged Project 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps (16/6), a pilot programme focused on giving rental subsidies to IDP families to facilitate the voluntary emptying of six large tent camps in Port-au-Prince and the return of IDPs to their 16 neighbourhoods of origin. Key to this intervention was supporting the reintegration of IDPs by increasing their access to basic services and income-generating activities.

Project 16/6 began in October 2011 and is being implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Office for Project Services and the United Nations Development Programme, under the guidance of the Government of Haiti. By employing the expertise of various international agencies, Project 16/6 has been able to provide more comprehensive assistance to its target constituents. As IOM worked to register families in tent camps, identify the vulnerable and secure durable housing solutions, the ILO sought to develop training programmes to reinforce competencies and provide greater economic opportunities to IDPs within the framework of Project 16/6.

In Haiti, only 22 per cent of the population reaches secondary school; formal vocational training is sparse and costly, thereby limiting its availability to most Haitians. Given the low levels of educational attainment, illiteracy is a serious challenge in the country. An estimated 55 per cent of the population is functionally illiterate (Haiti, Ministry of Education and Training, 2011). Not only does this constrain personal development and economic opportunities, it also constrains sectoral and national growth potential due to a lack of qualified workers.

Responding to these educational constraints, Project 16/6 developed an earthquake-resistant construction training curriculum adapted to the target population. Entitled Apprendre pour Reconstiturer Ayiti Solide (Learning to Rebuild a Solid Haiti – APRAS), the curriculum adopts a highly practical training methodology and incorporates the use of reference manuals to explain earthquake-resistant building techniques for semi-skilled masons, carpenters and metal workers. APRAS training manuals are primarily illustrative, using clear images and colours to explain each step of the construction process. The APRAS curriculum is serving as a basis for training 60 trainers and 1,500 construction workers. Once these trainers and construction workers have received Ministry of Education and Training certification, they become involved in the construction of homes for returning IDPs within the targeted neighbourhoods of Project 16/6.

In addition to training in the construction sector, Project 16/6 is engaging IDPs through vocational training programmes in targeted economic sectors. The extensive experience of the ILO in many countries reveals that technical skills alone are not sufficient for integration into the labour market (ILO, 2011). This is particularly true in developing country contexts such as Haiti characterized by high levels of unemployment and a largely informal economy. To bridge this gap, the curriculum includes a weighty emphasis on developing skills to increase employability and entrepreneurial capacities. Furthermore, given the social and educational profile of targeted participants, the curriculum integrates relevant topics to reinforce life skills and decrease vulnerability of IDPs.

The training programmes in Project 16/6 employ a modular methodology, representing a divergence from the traditional one- to two-year training programmes in Haiti which require a medium- to long-term commitment on the part of training participants. By contrast, the targeted modular courses allow training participants to acquire within a short time frame of 36 training hours a specific set of directly applicable competencies that facilitate greater access to the labour market. Furthermore, a modular structure better responds to the production needs within target communities, supporting the broader objective of local economic development.

The benefits of providing skills development and training programmes extend beyond the intended learning objectives and potential economic empowerment of IDPs. The following section explores the auxiliary benefits that training and skills development programmes provide to IDP populations and illustrates why such education for IDPs is crucial for long-term recovery.

**Education for empowerment**

During displacement, new daily risks exist where they did not exist previously. Increased health and sanitation concerns regularly emerge within IDP communities. By integrating highly relevant topics into the curriculum, education and training programmes in IDP communities can improve the quality of life and indeed save lives.

Education on topics such as basic sanitation, disease prevention and nutrition are important to promote behaviour change and an improved standard of living, especially among displaced populations where large numbers of people are living in close quarters. Owing to high instances of rape in emergency situations, raising awareness about HIV/AIDS and other sexually
transmitted infections is particularly important. Maternal health is also highly relevant as estimates suggest that as many as 25 per cent of women and girls of reproductive age living in camps are pregnant (Martone, 2010). Such education not only decreases the rate of mother and infant mortality, it also results in healthier babies and fewer pregnancies over the course of a lifetime. Furthermore, integrating disaster risk reduction education that teaches IDPs how to respond in emergencies such as earthquakes, floods and landslides can and does save lives. While the technical aspects of disaster risk reduction are channelled via national and local governments, there is also an urgent need to educate IDP communities and thereby ensure that behaviour change accompanies the technical assistance. This topic becomes particularly crucial as the frequency and severity of natural disasters increases across the globe.

Research has also shown that displaced persons experience a range of emotions from confusion to anger to fear and despair following exposure to an emergency. Women and young people are particularly susceptible to psychological trauma. The involvement in education and training programmes can serve to alleviate the long-term impact of such trauma. In his 2008 report focusing on displaced persons, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernon Muñoz, asserts that: “Education mitigates the psychosocial impact of conflict and disasters by giving a sense of normality, stability, structure and hope during a time of crisis, and provides essential building blocks for social reconstruction and future economic stability.”

Beyond giving students an individualized sense of hope and direction, training and livelihood programmes can also play a vital role in the community as a whole. The breakdown of social networks, toll on local leadership and loss of social services are all by-products of displacement, resulting in decreased community resilience. Educational programming can and should serve as a catalyst to engage and empower displaced communities.

**Education for prevention**

Education also acts as a deterrent to involvement in high-risk behaviours, particularly among youth. Research has demonstrated that where education is not available, individuals are more susceptible to recruitment, either forced or voluntary, into illegitimate activities such as gangs, the sex trade or forced labour (Women’s Refugee Commission, 2007).

An area of particular concern is the increased susceptibility of IDPs to recruitment into gangs, particularly among male youth. In post-earthquake Haiti, tent camps became a breeding ground for the resurgence of gangs and criminal activity, particularly sexual violence. Two factors that contribute to extreme vulnerability to gang recruitment are poverty and social dislocation, such that displaced youth and those separated from their families are particularly vulnerable.

Gangs often offer a home and a community to those who join their ranks. For IDPs who have recently lost just that, such an offer may seem irresistibly enticing. In interviews conducted with *soldats* (young gang members) from the streets of Port-au-Prince, very few were enrolled in school at the time of recruitment. They cite the element of protection while living on the streets after the earthquake as one of the primary reasons for joining a gang. Ironically they each wear rosaries of a different colour to indicate with which gang they are affiliated. Many IDPs who have lost family members and homes, or have been victims of violence, often believe that they have no hope or future and thus become more willing to join gangs.

Globally, human trafficking is on the rise. Research has shown that, in emergency situations, the collapse of rule of law, rising criminality and weak protection mechanisms, combined with vulnerability due to displacement, make IDPs a highly targeted group for trafficking (Klopcic, 2004). In such situations, traffickers prey particularly on displaced women and children, using the increased levels of vulnerability to their advantage for exploitative purposes. Traffickers often present victims with an opportunity to improve their social, economic or political situation in more developed cities or countries. While such an offer before displacement might not have been appealing, IDPs may feel they have no viable alternative and respond accordingly. The reality upon arrival, however, is not the fresh start they were promised.

In Haiti, traffickers not only recruit vulnerable youth into the sex trade, but the trafficking and sale of young people as restaveks, a form of domestic servitude widely considered as modern-day slavery, has also flourished in the post-earthquake context. Many young people were separated from or lost their parents or primary caregivers as a result of the earthquake, making them prime targets for traffickers. Considered one of the worst forms of child labour, it is estimated that there are more than 225,000 young people living as restaveks in

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5 Ibid.

6 To learn more about IOM work to combat sexual violence in the tent camps of Port-au-Prince and to treat victims, see the short video Moving out of the Shadows, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=imH2omz2dYF.

7 Personal communication, August 2012.
Haiti. The problem is exacerbated by a failure by the Government of Haiti to actively condemn the practice, which is sometimes seen as a cultural phenomenon in Haiti.

Enrolment in education and training programmes is a mitigating factor that decreases vulnerability and the likelihood of getting caught up in activities such as gangs, the sex trade or forced labour. It represents a symbol of change and an investment in the future. It serves as a lifeline for those who have lost everything. Even in situations of recurring displacement, education is one item that individuals are able to carry with them wherever they go. In recognition of this, education is often named by leaders of displaced populations as a priority need for their community. In fact, communities rank the need for education and skills as a higher priority than food, water, medicine and even shelter in many cases (Martone, 2010).

Intersectionality

To fully understand the problem, it is vital to recognize the intersection between poverty, illiteracy and vulnerability to emergencies. Often it is those with the least resources who are the most affected. Although global demographic statistics for IDPs is an area in need of greater development, national surveys conducted in States with high IDP populations demonstrate that those living in poverty, ethnic minorities and women are disproportionately affected by displacement (IDMC, 2011). Incidentally, these are the exact same sectors of the population among which low levels of education attainment prevail (UNESCO, 2010). This intersectionality further demonstrates the tremendous need for education and training programmes in IDP communities. Primary education offers great value, but in itself will not provide displaced persons with the tools needed to navigate this transitional time and prepare for rebuilding their lives after resettlement. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasizes this point by noting:

As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities. Education has a vital role in empowering women, safeguarding children from exploitative and hazardous labour and sexual exploitation, promoting human rights and democracy, protecting the environment, and controlling population growth. Increasingly, education is recognized as one of the best financial investments States can make.\(^8\)

Overlooking the educational needs of youth and adult IDPs further perpetuates the marginalization created by intersectionality and neglects an opportunity to break the cycle of poverty. Skills development and training need to be integrated into the humanitarian assistance framework as vital components of the recovery process. Training programmes not only offer a sense of purpose and stability to displaced persons, but they also provide critical skills to prepare IDPs to sustainably rebuild their lives, their communities and their countries.

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\(^8\) For more information on the restavek system and Project 16/6 activities to combat child slavery, see ILO, 2012.