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Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko¹

Welcome to the eleventh issue of *Migration Policy Practice*. This issue covers a range of policy areas including the second UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development; issues of climate change and migration in the MENA region; new trends in North–South migration; and migration as a development enabler in the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

The first article, by Peter Sutherland, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration, discusses some of the expectations and challenges related to the second UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, to be held in New York in October this year. According to Peter Sutherland, the summit must generate action on how to reduce the costs and raise the quality of migration, and it must also determine how states and other stakeholders can deepen their cooperation in solving migration-related problems. In particular, in order for the second High Level Dialogue to be successful, it must achieve four goals:

- UN Member States should forge a consensus position on incorporating migration into the next iteration of the Millennium Development Goals.
- There must be a commitment by states to help some of the most vulnerable migrants—those affected by acute-onset crises.
- States should acknowledge the success of the Global Forum by committing to its long-term sustainability, including by providing predictable financial support.
- There must be a vigorous debate to help define a set of priorities for the next decade. This includes a better understanding of what changes are needed in the global governance of migration and in the institutions that oversee the movement of people across borders.

The second article, by Quentin Wodon and Andrea Liverani, outlines some of the findings of a recent study on climate change and migration in the MENA region conducted by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The study is based in large part on a household survey as well as qualitative data collected in 2011 in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. The article suggests that the coping and adaptation strategies used by households to deal with weather shocks are diverse, but also limited, with

most households not able to recover from the negative impact of weather shocks. The ability of community level responses and government programmes to support households is also very limited. Finally, while climate change is not currently the main driver of migration flows, it does contribute to these flows, so that worsening climatic conditions are likely to exacerbate future migration flows.

The third article, by Frank Laczko and Tara Brian, draws attention to the fact that while policymakers have noted the significance of South–South migration, for example in EC Communications and in GFMD debates, virtually no attention is being paid to North–South migration to developing countries. There is no discussion of why people are leaving Europe and the impact of such migration on developing countries and Europe. Furthermore, the debate about remittances and diaspora benefits of migration to date has focused primarily on South–North migration. The article discusses a range of recent data defining the nature and scale of current North–South migratory flows, as well as the possible implications for development, both in the North and in the South, of such flows. One of the article's conclusions is that since the future global development agenda is likely to focus on development of all countries, not only the poorest ones, there would be merit in North–South migration being factored into this debate.

The last article, by Chris Richter, sets out to define the contents and implications of the so-called 'development enablers', which were included in the new framework to pursue poverty eradication and achieve sustainable development after 2015 drafted by the United Nations Task Team (UNTT) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda. According to the UNTT, development enablers are intended to support progress towards four key dimensions of development: inclusive economic development; inclusive social development; environmental sustainability; and peace and security. The article explains that migration fits well within a concept of development enablers that focuses on managing the implications of globalization and increased connectivity. However, the most important point to note is that while migration offers tremendous opportunities to development, the extent to which it does so is contingent on the migration process itself being safe, humane and orderly. Effective policies are therefore important to assisting migration achieve its potential for development, and incorporating migration into the Post-2015 Development Agenda is an essential part of this.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of *Migration Policy Practice* and encourage readers to contact us with suggestions for future articles.

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Migration 2.0: A time for action at the UN Summit on Migration and Development

Peter D. Sutherland¹

In October this year, for only the second time in its history, the UN General Assembly will focus on international migration. Nearly a billion people rely on migration as the best way to increase their personal liberty and to improve health, education, and economic outcomes for their families. If the right policies are put in place, there is clear evidence that states can magnify these positive outcomes, while also generating significant financial and social gains for countries of origin and destination.

To succeed, October's summit must generate action on how to reduce the economic and human costs of migration. It also must determine how states and other stakeholders can deepen their cooperation in solving migration-related problems—all while avoiding the political axe-grinding typical of most migration debates.

The portents were not positive as the first-ever UN summit on migration approached in 2006. Knife-edged rhetoric on human rights and national sovereignty prevailed over substantive deliberations on how to improve the lives of migrants. Old animosities pitted north versus south, countries of origin against countries of destination. But beneath this political posturing lay a pent-up desire to begin addressing the problems and opportunities created by international migration—challenges that require cooperative action.

So when Kofi Annan and I proposed the creation of a Global Forum on Migration and Development, the conversation shifted. The Forum—informal, non-binding, and designed for policymakers rather than politicians or diplomats—was evolutionary and unthreatening. Critically, it framed migration in a positive and practical light by twinning it with development. This allowed all states to feel they had something concrete to gain by working together.

The Forum's value is now self-evident: over 150 countries gather every year to consider joint action that addresses common challenges—from ensuring that migrant workers are paid fairly and treated decently, to cracking down on smugglers and traffickers, and changing public perceptions of migrants. It is a safe harbour in which governments build trust and a common understanding. In addition to the advent of the Global Forum, the 2006

summit also produced the Global Migration Group, which brings together 14 UN agencies, IOM and the World Bank to coordinate their migration-related work.

It all adds up to more than just talk; recent years have seen real, if gradual, progress.

Take remittances: Average fees charged by banks on the USD 401 billion migrants sent home to developing countries in 2012 fell to 7 per cent, from 12 per cent a few years ago—a savings of USD 20 billion for migrants and their families. In some corridors, money transfer fees are approaching zero. More countries are engaging diasporas by tapping their knowledge, networks, and capital to advance health, education, and economic goals. Normative progress is also apparent: The Domestic Workers Convention enters into force this September, creating the potential for an estimated 50–100 million home workers (mostly migrants) to be protected under national labour laws. Some countries, meanwhile, have been mainstreaming migration into national development strategies, while also making more vigorous efforts to protect their workers abroad.

In October this year, after seven years of intensifying international engagement, the UN's 192 member states will convene again to discuss migration. This time the summit must produce more than new processes like the Global Forum and the GMG. It should deliver an action-oriented agenda for how to create a safer, more transparent system of international mobility that protects the rights of migrants, serves shared economic interests, quells public anxieties about migration, and helps cast migrants less as scapegoats and more as vital members of our communities.

It's a very tall order. But the prerequisites for progress are in place—and missing this opportunity would be shameful. Migrants suffer unconscionable abuses, from the shocking—38 domestic workers from Indonesia are believed to be on death row in Saudi Arabia, many for questionable reasons—to the mundane—the typical Nepali labour migrant to the Gulf loses a third of his wages to exploitative recruiters. Attacks and discrimination against migrants are growing on every continent, while anti-immigrant politicians are gaining adherents. And tens of millions of families endure the hardship of separation that is an inherent, painful aspect of migration.

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We can—and must—do much better than this. If the right policies are in place, we can ensure that migrants move, work, and live with greater dignity and security, and that our neglect of migration does not enable political extremists.

All together now: The four pillars of growing cooperation

Four significant trends have converged that should raise the odds that the upcoming UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, to be held October 3–4 this year, produces meaningful results.

First, the number of states with a stake in international migration has exploded. One telling metric is membership in the International Organization for Migration, which stands today at 151 states, versus 90 in 2001. In parallel, the dividing line between countries of origin and destination has blurred. States that a decade ago considered themselves origin countries, like Mexico and Turkey, now are home to large numbers of migrants. Meanwhile, in just a generation, countries like Greece and Spain have gone from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration—and back again.

An important trend in these evolving flows is that migration is no longer mostly about poor people moving to rich countries. Movement is now quite evenly divided, with about a third of migrants going from one developing country to another, a third going from developing to developed countries, and the balance moving within the developed world. South–South migration, moreover, is accelerating.

In total, there are an estimated 214 million international migrants, from just 150 million in 2000; this number is projected to exceed 400 million by 2040. Yet even that larger figure fails to reflect the true impact of migration, as it excludes the hundreds of millions of people who rely on the income of migrant family members. It is safe to say that nearly a billion people rely on migration as the best way to increase their personal liberty and to improve health, education, and economic outcomes for their families. If the right policies are put in place, there is clear evidence that states can magnify these positive outcomes, while also generating significant financial and social gains for countries of origin and destination.

All this means that more and more states have an interest in thinking and acting holistically about migration, rather than seeing it only from the vantage point of an origin or destination country. Their points of view are slowly converging, creating greater potential for common action.

The second trend can reinforce this bent toward cooperation: The emergence of a solid evidence base on how migration impacts development, and on which

policies work best. This will not completely quiet debates about brain drain and the other ill effects of migration; but it makes it harder for policymakers not to take cost-effective actions they know can benefit migrants and the communities they support. Evidence also allows states to share a common understanding of migration grounded in fact, thus deflating the mythology and theology that distorts the debate.

It is hard to understate how critical this growing evidence base is in moving governments to act. Many national policymakers and development agencies had long seen migration as a sign of failure, rather than as inherent to the human spirit. In their eyes, if development policies succeed, then people should not need to migrate. In other words, migration has been seen as a problem to be solved—not as a solution to a problem. By thinking this way, development actors squandered a valuable opportunity to design policies that might have magnified the benefits of migration and better protected the rights of migrants.

Those narrow-minded days are over. Over the past year, migration stakeholders—led by Sweden, Switzerland, Bangladesh, and several international organizations—have catalysed an effort to ensure that migration is given full consideration in the post-2015 development agenda. Their arguments—built as they are on solid evidence—should resonate as the successor framework to the Millennium Development Goals is constructed in the coming years. I am fully supporting their efforts.

The third trend is the proliferation of conversations about migration among policymakers at the regional level. From Bali to Budapest, Abu Dhabi to East Africa, governments gather regularly to work on migration challenges that affect their regions. Today, two dozen such regional consultative processes (RCPs) exist. Countries that were once silent on migration in international debates, such as the Gulf States and the Russian Federation, are now vigorous participants; South–South cooperation, a rarity in the past, also is growing through such processes. RCPs are laboratories where ideas can be tested, potentially gaining global relevance. They are also where states build trust and habits of cooperation with each other.

The search for partners also extends to non-state actors, which have become crucial actors in efforts to create a safer, fairer international migration system. The activation of such non-state actors—which include employers, NGOs and philanthropies—is the fourth trend that should abet international cooperation on migration in the coming decade.

These stakeholders play several crucial roles: They compensate for the attenuation of governments, whose capacity to contend with migration has diminished due to the global economic crisis—at the very moment when migration is growing rapidly. Second, NGOs

live and work daily with migrants and can alert us to incipient problems. Third, civil society actors are risk takers, able to act when governments are too fearful to do so. Employers, meanwhile, not only determine how migrants are treated in the workplace, they also can be effective advocates for reform—as we are seeing in the current US immigration debate.

The strengthening of these non-state actors in the migration debate is part of a broader trend—reflected not only in the human rights movement but also in the acceptance of principles such as the Responsibility to Protect—that helps bring the interests of individuals to the fore in policymaking. Migration has long been the exclusive domain of states. Migrants, especially the undocumented, have had almost no voice in shaping policy. Today, that is changing.

These are all hopeful trends. But there are countervailing forces at work, too. For instance, the *criminal* private sector—smugglers, traffickers, and exploitative recruiters—also has been empowered in recent years. This makes it even more urgent for us to make the most of the HLD next autumn.

The shape of success at the High-Level Dialogue

A Post-2015 consensus: First, UN Member States should forge a consensus position on incorporating migration into the next iteration of the Millennium Development Goals. Migration's inclusion in the post-2015 development agenda is the best way, in the short term, to formally bring migration under the UN umbrella—a goal that is dear to many stakeholders. This also would help reshape public perceptions: Migrants might gradually be cast as agents of positive change, rather than as desperate people fleeing failing states.

The evidence is clear. Data from 74 developing countries suggests that remittances have a strong impact on reducing poverty, including its depth and severity. Migrants use their earnings to support families and communities, pay for education and healthcare, and invest in productive enterprises. Because they are stable and often anti-cyclical, remittances also contribute to the stability of recipient economies. In 2009, in the wake of financial crisis, remittance flows fell 5 per cent; by contrast, foreign direct investment to developing countries plunged 89 per cent.

Remittances improve health outcomes for families and children left behind: The higher incomes and better health knowledge associated with migration have a positive influence on infant and child mortality rates. When it comes to education, children in households with a migrant family member are more likely to be enrolled in school and to complete more years of schooling, and less likely to leave school. Girls in particular often benefit. A migrant who moves from a less developed country to

an advanced industrial one sees a 15-fold increase in income, a doubling in educational enrollment, and a 16-fold reduction in infant mortality.

The bottom line is that migration has been instrumental in achieving several of the current MDGs, including poverty reduction, gender equality, the prevention of infectious diseases, and environmental sustainability.

The contributions of migrants to destination countries, meanwhile, are obvious and manifold. The world's 105 million labour migrants are the safety valve in the global economy, helping meet critical needs for labourers. Migrants are the backbone of health systems in many OECD countries. There would be no 2022 World Cup Qatar without millions of mostly Asian migrant construction workers. The inventiveness of migrants is also invaluable: US data shows that a 1.3 per cent increase in the share of migrant university graduates increases the number of patents issued per capita by 15 per cent—without any adverse effects on the innovative activity of natives.

The next generation development agenda is being fiercely contested—advocates for dozens of causes are fighting for space on what will be a limited list of post-2015 goals. But even if the efforts of migration stakeholders fall short of the loftiest expectations, their hard work already is paying dividends. They have had to systematically and more precisely assess how migration contributes to development; this will lead to smarter, more effective policies. They also have had to learn to make their case to development actors (not an easy crowd to please!) and to the broader policy arena.

Already, we have the outlines of what might be dubbed Migration Development Goals. These could be built around the targets of lowering the costs of migration, such as fees that go to visas, recruiters, and banks; raising its quality, by mutually recognizing credentials, making pensions more portable; increasing safety; and reducing discrimination.

Some measures are commonsensical and relatively simple to implement. The Mexican Government, for instance, created the Remesamex website that allows remittance senders to compare fees—a model that should exist in every country. A partnership between the US Federal Reserve and Banco de México, meanwhile, allows remittances to be sent to any account in Mexico for just USD 5 fee, regardless of the amount.

Other fixes, while more complex, are also feasible. Only 20–25 per cent of international migrants, for example, can take their social security benefits with them when they return home. Yet some countries are far more successful than others in protecting their workers: The majority of migrants from Morocco (89%), Algeria (87%), and Turkey (68%), to take three, are covered by

bilateral portability agreements. There is no reason why this cannot be a global standard.

All this needs to come together at the HLD, when migration stakeholders must speak with one, powerful voice to the powers that will shape the post-2015 agenda.

Action on migrants in crisis: A second goal for the HLD involves a commitment by states to help some of the most vulnerable migrants—those affected by acute-onset crises, such as the conflicts in Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic or natural disasters like the floods in Thailand. Hundreds of thousands of migrant workers were stranded by the Libyan war; their employers were not obligated to repatriate them and their countries of origin either did not have the means or the will to do so (some countries did an excellent job, such as the Philippines, China, and Turkey, many with the direct assistance of IOM in evacuating more than 200,000 of their citizens to safety and helping them reintegrate back home).

We need to have plans in place that clarify who will come to the aid of migrants when tragedy strikes and to ensure that emergency relief laws apply equally to all residents of a country. When Hurricane Sandy struck the United States last autumn, for example, emergency health and housing aid (to take two examples) was blind to immigration status.

I have urged stakeholders to create a framework for action on assisting migrants in such situations. The HLD could endorse this initiative. While it only addresses a small fraction of vulnerable migrants, it is important in several ways. It takes global cooperation from the realm of rhetoric to that of action. It expands the conversation beyond the strict migration and development framing, in the same evolutionary way that the Global Forum catalysed international cooperation in 2006. It compels more complex coordination that involves not only international agencies, but primarily states, as well as employers and civil society. IOM's Migration Crisis Operation Framework, endorsed by IOM Member States in 2012, is a critical contribution in this regard.

And if all these actors begin to act in concert to help migrants in acute crises, there is no reason why they will not eventually be able to assist other vulnerable migrants.

A redoubled commitment to the Global Forum and GMG: Third, states should acknowledge the success of the Global Forum by committing to its long-term sustainability, including by providing predictable financial support. Similarly, states should herald the efforts of the Global Migration Group to create a more robust infrastructure and a multiyear agenda. An important part of the GMG agenda should involve

capacity building on data collection related to migration and immigrant integration, without which policymakers will be seriously hampered (especially in states that are relatively new to mass immigration).

Forging a forward agenda to solve problems: Finally, and perhaps most important: States should arrive in New York City next October fully prepared to discuss the migration-related challenges that they are committed to solving together. A vigorous debate can be the first step in helping define a set of priorities for the next decade. By mapping where the political will lies, we can then better understand what changes we might need in the global governance of migration and in the institutions that oversee the movement of people across borders.

The list of challenges is daunting. Beyond those related to migration and development, we also must face up to the appalling levels of discrimination and abuse we are seeing against migrants. The omens are disturbing: from South Africa—where new research last month found that a majority of citizens believe undocumented migrants should not receive police protection—to Europe—where anti-immigrant extremists are gaining favor from Sweden to Germany to Greece. Bias against immigrants is often fed by misperceptions.

Publics also consider immigrants to be prone to criminal behaviour, when, in fact, the data does not support that conclusion. One major reason why this myth persists is that countries everywhere place migrants in detention, or even deport them, for non-criminal offenses—a fact that cements public views of migrants as miscreants. Appallingly, many migrants, including children, are held in solitary confinement.

As the Secretary General's Special Representative, I will be listening carefully to what states and other stakeholders have to say in October, in order to develop recommendations for setting priorities on migration and on what institutional changes might advance those priorities.

All these are modest but important steps. They signal a commitment by the international community to act rather than just talk.

Bottom up, top down: Mutually reinforcing strategies

The biggest risk facing the HLD is that a practical, incremental agenda is derailed by the desire of some stakeholders to focus on grander moves—drafting a new international convention on migration, for instance, or creating a body that might evolve into a global migration agency empowered to regulate cross-border movements.

These goals are admirable. Their supporters should continue to advocate for them, making their case as

persuasively as possible. However, there is little sign of a consensus to carry forward such larger ambitions; too many states are simply too protective of their sovereignty, and are also hemmed in by the toxic domestic politics of migration.

Working from the bottom up, by solving practical problems related to migration, will eventually enable broader normative action. Smaller groups of states, banding together in a kind of mini-multilateralism, can trail-blaze solutions to common challenges that might eventually become global standards. This will only speed the way to a normative future.

The bottom-up practical approach and the top-down normative one share a common cause: To improve outcomes for migrants and our societies. The pursuit of grander goals should not undermine more incremental efforts; polarization between these two approaches would jeopardize all progress. States must eschew the short-term satisfaction of scoring political points in favor of working hard at cooperation.

We are on the threshold of a new era of international cooperation on migration. Let's make sure we cross over it in October.

Climate change and migration in the MENA region

Quentin Wodon and Andrea Liverani¹

Introduction

Climate change and migration are major concerns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, yet the empirical evidence on the impact of climate change and extreme weather events on migration remains limited. Information is broadly lacking on how households in vulnerable areas perceive changes in the climate, how they are affected by extreme weather events, whether they benefit from community and government programmes to help them cope with and adapt to a changing climate and how these conditions influence the decision of household members to migrate, either temporarily or permanently.

This brief article summarizes some of the results of a recent study on climate change and migration in the MENA region by the World Bank and Agence Française de Développement (AFD). The study is based in large part on new household survey as well as qualitative data collected in 2011 in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. The results suggest that households do perceive important changes in the climate and that they are being affected by extreme weather events resulting in losses in income, crops and livestock. The coping and adaptation strategies used by households to deal with weather shocks are diverse, but also limited, with most households not able to recover from the negative impact of weather shocks. The ability of community level responses and government programmes to support households is also very limited. Finally, while climate change is not today the main driver of migration flows, it does contribute to these flows, so that worsening climatic conditions are likely to exacerbate future migration flows.

Perceptions and impacts of weather shocks

Do households living in areas susceptible of being affected by climate change believe that changes

in climate patterns are taking place? Questions on perceptions of climate change were asked the surveys with a focus on the last five years and Adoho and Wodon (2013a) show that indeed households do believe that the climate has been changing. In the combined sample for the five countries where new household surveys were implemented, more than three fourths of households declare that rain has become more erratic, and almost three quarters say that temperatures are higher. Between half and two thirds declare that there is less rain today than five years ago, that the land is dryer or less fertile, that the rainy season starts later, is shorter, or ends earlier, and that droughts are more frequent. The changes in climate also appear to lead to more diseases in animals and livestock, more insects and pets in crops, less water in boreholes, rivers, lakes or streams, more air pollution, more frequent crop failures and livestock loss, and more soil erosion. Some of the extreme weather events associated with climate change such as rain storms and floods are not perceived as more frequent, but overall, while there are differences between households and areas, there is a clear feeling that the climate is worsening. Importantly, many households affected by weather shocks declared suffering losses, especially in terms of crop and income, but also in terms of livestock.

In focus groups as well the majority of respondents mentioned long-term shifts in climate and they attributed declining agriculture fortunes to deteriorating environmental conditions caused by changing weather patterns (Grant et al., 2013). For crops such as potatoes, wheat and rice, the results may be devastating: *“Rice is burnt in some seasons, because we cannot find enough water to irrigate it”* (Male, 36–45 years old, Egypt²). The inability to earn a stable income for crops makes it difficult to rely solely on agriculture as a source of revenue. *“The conditions [for] farming are very poor. There’s drought on the one hand and the unavailability of the new equipment and poor methods we use on the other hand. ... All farmers in this region have been affected by the drought and lost their yields* (Male, 35–45

¹ Quentin Wodon is an Adviser with the Human Development Network and Andrea Liverani is a Senior Social Development Specialist with the Middle East and North Africa Region, both at the World Bank. This article summarizes the findings of a study co-sponsored by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement. The opinions expressed in the article and the broader study are only those of the authors, and need not represent those of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent, nor need they represent the opinions of the Agence Française de Développement.

² In the case of Egypt, the fact that much of the agriculture is irrigated means that results, including quotes from the qualitative work, must be interpreted with care. When farmers are faced with lack of water, as this quote suggests, this may be related to shortages in the allocation of irrigation water which can themselves be due to any number of problems that need not be related to climate change, such as the upstream use of the Nile water by others.

years old, Algeria).” In Yemen, residents from Hudaydah emphasized the problems of warm weather and increasing heat waves. Furthermore, unfavorable crop prices have led some growers to shift from cultivating food crops to qat which is more profitable but requires a great deal of water: “People there [in villages] work shoulder to shoulder, but the problem lies in agriculture. They have stopped cultivating crops ... and replaced them with qat” (Male, 30–39 years old, Yemen).

Coping and adaptation strategies

What are the coping strategies that households declare having used, or could be using to cope with climate change and weather shocks? In the five country sample, 60.6 per cent of households declare that they have used or would use their savings, 46.8 have sold or would sell their assets, 46.2 per cent have asked for a loan or would do so, 40.6 per cent have sold or would sell their livestock, and 36.4 per cent have withdrawn or would withdraw their children from school (Adoho and Wodon, 2013b). The proportions of households resorting to these coping strategies are higher among lower quintiles which have fewer other means to cope. There are differences between countries, especially regarding the possibility of withdrawing children from school – in Egypt this is not being considered by most households. Also, households receiving international remittances, who tend to be better off, are less likely to resort to these various coping strategies, except using their savings. The qualitative focus groups also reveal different coping strategies, including selling assets, shifting food consumption habits and removing children from school to have them support the household (Grant et al., 2013).

Households were also asked about actions that they took or might take to cope with the loss of crops, income or livestock due to weather or environmental changes. As shown by Adoho and Wodon (2013b), between one in four and one in five households have relied or would rely more on stored grains/products and stored water, have sought or would seek off-farm work, have used or would use more fertilizers or pesticides, or have made or would make a change in their farm production technology. Undertaking training for non-farm work or changing crop mixes and varieties is mentioned by about 15 per cent of households, versus only nine per cent for changing the crops versus livestock mix. Thus most households do not implement many adaptation strategies. However more than four in ten households say that they know people who have moved out of the community due to climate pressures, and 14 per cent say that some people have moved in, which may generate conflict over water, land, or livestock.

The qualitative work suggests that residents often rely on each other to cope and adapt: “Rural residents are

willing to pay [give] half of what we have to help others. If I have 10 pounds, I will pay 5. If I have 100 pounds, I will pay 50. This is how the social norms work here. We are all one family” (Male, 36–45 years old, Egypt). Yet solidarity does not always work, and conflicts over natural resources do occur due to changes in climate, as the estimates in table 3 show. In Yemen in particular, rural residents worried in the focus groups that water scarcity has led to conflict over access to wells. One Yemeni woman described a water distribution scheme where water is distributed to certain communities on certain days of the week. For farmers in all five countries, living in impoverished rural areas is not only difficult financially, but it also has negative impacts for health, a concern mentioned in Egyptian focus groups. Farmers may be increasingly exposed to contaminated water because waste leaks into irrigation canals. Others mention being sick. With only limited income at their disposal, many households cannot afford quality health care and they also often cannot access health facilities (Grant et al., 2013).

What about community level responses? Households were asked whether to cope with the loss of crops, income or livestock due to weather or environmental changes, the communities in which they live did any of the following: planting trees or installing soil protection measures; building banks on rivers, streams or small check banks to reduce flooding; developing new infrastructure such as boreholes, wells, irrigation or roads; gathering and disseminating information on measures to reduce the loss of crops, income or livestock; taking measures to prepare for future disasters like floods or droughts; taking action to improve market access for agricultural products or handicrafts; and taking action to purchase seeds, animals or farm equipment. In most cases community action is limited. As shown by Adoho and Wodon (2013b), only one in five households declare that the community has planted trees or taken soil erosion measures, and one in seven mentioned measures to purchase seeds, animals or farm equipment. The other actions are mentioned by only one in ten households or less.

Similar questions were asked about governments, albeit with slightly different modalities, including more transfers and social protection programmes, such as cash or food for work programmes, cash for food during floods and droughts, as well as the provision of drinking water, the provision of skills training programmes, the provision of credit during crop loss, improvements in access to markets through transportation, and price support for crops when agricultural prices are low. Except for the provision of drinking water which is probably less related to climate change and shocks, government involvement in adaptation strategies and safety nets is also limited. For most programmes, only about one in

ten households declared that the government has been active.

The fact that community and government programmes to help households cope with weather shocks and adapt to climate change are the exception rather than the rule was also a conclusion of the qualitative work. When asked about such programmes, respondents said that they were aware of few programmes and organizations geared towards assisting the rural poor affected by climate change. Participants suggested areas where government initiatives could help, such as the provision of agricultural inputs or loans to purchase machinery. Job training and improved employment opportunities were also mentioned. Yet some respondents, especially in Yemen, were doubtful that government programmes would bear fruit, due to corruption and distrust.

Migration

Migration is also a way to cope with and adapt to changes in climatic and environmental conditions. In the five country sample, the data suggest that three in every ten households (29.9%) have migrants, whether residents (current members of the households) or non-residents (former members of the household). Lower rates are obtained when restricting migration to the last five years. At the individual level, 7.6 per cent of individuals in the sample as a whole have migrated temporarily, and the proportion over the last five years is 6.2 per cent. For permanent migration, the rates are 8 per cent in the sample as a whole, and 5.7 per cent in the last five years (Adoho and Wodon, 2013c). Most migration is internal, but the likelihood of migration abroad is high in Egypt and also in general higher for individuals from higher quintiles, as expected due to the cost of international migration. For both residents and non-residents, migration to urban areas, and especially to large cities, is much more likely than migration to rural areas.

To what extent are households migrating away from climate affected areas, and is climate itself a key push factor in such migration? This is a complex question,

but several papers prepared for the study (Adoho and Wodon 2013c, Nguyen and Wodon 2013, Joseph and Wodon 2013a, and Joseph et al. 2013a) suggest on the basis of regression results that poor climate and extreme weather events lead to a higher probability of migration, but the role of climate is smaller than that of socioeconomic characteristics and job prospects in cities.

Focus groups data reported in Grant et al. (2013) also suggest a link between climate and migration, although again the role of socioeconomic factors is probably at least as important as that of climatic conditions. Respondents linked migration to chronic droughts which lead to declining agricultural productivity: “The lack of water has resulted in a failure to be able to cultivate rice and it is an important crop” (Male, 25–35 years old, Dakhalia, Egypt). On the other hand, few mentioned flooding or being displaced as a result of natural disasters as a reason for relocation. Respondents appear to choose migration after other strategies have proven unsuccessful. The qualitative work also suggests that remittances are important, especially in Yemen where there is a long-standing tradition of migration to Saudi Arabia.

Table 1 summarizes in a very stylized way the main findings. The evidence suggests that worsening climatic conditions, or the perceptions thereof, are clearly a push factor leading to temporary migration away from the affected (mostly rural) areas, with the evidence being weaker for permanent migration. It must be noted that in an analysis such as that of Joseph and Wodon (2013a) which is at the level of a country as a whole, the impact of the climate on the overall patterns of migration tends to be diluted. By contrast, in the analysis based on the five countries sample, as well as when looking at weather shocks with another national Morocco survey, the effects are estimated mostly on those affected by shocks, which also explains why the impacts are larger in affected areas. In those areas, it seems fair to suggest that climate conditions account for at least 10 to 20 per cent of the current migration flows, and this could increase in the future.

Table 1: Summary Results from Regression Analysis on Weather Shocks and Migration

| Variables | Country | Paper | Temporary | Permanent | Magnitude |
|--|-------------|---|-----------|-----------|-------------|
| Perceptions of climate change | 5 countries | Adoho & Wodon (2013c) | + | Weak | Substantial |
| Recall of weather shocks and structural changes in climate | Morocco | Nguyen & Wodon (2013) | + | Weak | Substantial |
| Actual climate variables | Yemen | Joseph & Wodon (2013a) Joseph et al. (2013a) | NA | + | Smaller |
| Qualitative focus groups | 5 countries | Grant et al. (2013) | + | + | Substantial |

Source: Authors. Note: NA = not applicable.

Conclusion and policy implications

A solid foundation for decision-making related to climate change adaptation involves four iterative steps: (1) Assessing climate risks, impacts, and opportunities for action; (2) Prioritizing policy and project options; (3) Implementing responses in sectors and regions; and (4) Monitoring and evaluating implementation, then reassessing the climate risks, impacts, and opportunities (Verner, 2012). The World Bank-AFD study falls squarely within the first of these four steps. The aim of this study was to contribute to a better understanding of perceptions of climate change, environmental degradation, and extreme weather events and their relationship to migration and other coping strategies in the MENA region. Quantitative and qualitative data collection activities were implemented in climate-affected areas in five countries, and existing census and survey data for Morocco and Yemen were used as well. The analysis suggests that a majority of households do perceive important changes in the climate, such as more erratic rain, higher temperatures, less rain, dryer and less fertile land and more frequent droughts.

These changes have led to a range of negative consequences for agriculture and livestock production, and extreme weather events have been associated with losses in incomes, crops, and livestock. The coping and adaptation strategies used by households to deal with shocks are diverse, including migration, selling various assets and taking other emergency measures to get by, as well as changing the household's sources of livelihoods in terms of crops, livestock production, and off-farm work among others. Yet many households do not appear to use these strategies, and in addition the extent to which they benefit from community and government programmes and initiatives to help them cope with weather or environmental changes is limited.

In terms of migration, the study suggests that the impact of weather shocks and deteriorating conditions on migration is positive, leading to higher temporary and in some cases permanent migration. In the areas most affected by climate change, the analysis suggests that climate factors may account for between one tenth and one fifth of the overall level of migration observed today, but this is likely to increase as climate conditions continue to deteriorate. Furthermore, while many migrants appreciate the opportunities that migration offers, their living conditions and their ability to be well integrated in their areas of destination is far from being guaranteed, especially given intense competition for relatively few good job opportunities.

Beyond addressing an existing research gap though, the findings provide much ground for policy development. Several broad areas of implications for policy are highlighted below.

First, affected communities call for more government action to help with adaptation. In line with the conclusions reached in the recent study led by Verner (2012) on adaptation in the MENA region, we have shown the extent to which households in vulnerable rural areas are affected by climate change and weather shocks, and how their ability to cope and adapt to these shocks is limited. The cost of climate change and weather shocks is already felt today by many rural households, who are essentially left on their own in the absence of strong community responses and government programmes in the geographic areas studied. While we have not conducted any cost-benefit analysis to assess which types of programmes might help households the most in rural sending areas - such analysis would need to take local conditions into account, we have demonstrated the need for more assistance in order to help households cope and adapt, given the substantial damage already caused to livelihoods by changing weather patterns. The populations sampled in this study perceive a lack of effective government interventions to address the impacts of climate change and the migration it generates, and collective action solutions do not seem to work. The gap in the public provision and financing of adaption interventions leaves individuals and communities alone in making choices and decisions, including through migration. Although this leaves space for private initiatives, it also leaves the space vulnerable to forms of uncoordinated action that may lead to conflict and maladaptation.

The role of safety nets and broader social protection programmes is especially important in this context, both for migrants and their families in sending areas. MENA governments should be encouraged to adopt and expand the coverage of their social protection and safety net programmes. The coverage of those programmes appears very thin in the areas surveyed for this study. Investments in safety net systems could have immediate pay-offs in the short-run as well as in the long-run when the consequences of climatic change may become more obvious. In addition, it would be important to highlight the fact that the design, coverage and placement of safety net programmes would not be just for the purpose of minimizing the future impacts of climate change; instead safety nets should be seen as an integral part of the governments' broader strategy towards poverty reduction and urbanization and they should provide portable skills and human capital to the segments of the population that need it the most (we come back to this below).

Second, migration policy needs to understand and address climate induced migration in the context of other push and pull factors. The study has shown that while environmental and climatic factors do play a role in driving migration, a range of other socioeconomic factors are at play. Although uncertainties remain as to the magnitude of future climate change and its effects

on migration, focusing on environmental degradation alone as the dominant driver of migration would be misleading. Similarly, characterizing environmental degradation as key driver of transborder migration is also potentially misleading: in the countries studies, when environmental factors play a role, migration is mostly internal. These findings run somewhat against the received wisdom behind much of the recent global hype around climate migration, but they are in line with the results of other assessments, including the recently released Foresight report on environmental change and migration (Foresight, 2011). Identifying climate migration more squarely as a domestic policy issue will lead to a different type of attention to the problem for both domestic policymakers in MENA countries and donors alike.

Third, migration can be conceived of as a form of adaptation, but it is often seen as a solution of last resort by households, especially in the qualitative work presented in this study. One reason for this is that migration may be perceived as more costly than other strategies such as using savings, selling assets, getting into debt, or withdrawing children from school. In addition to material costs (travelling and re-lodging), migration implies substantial risks due to unknown outcomes (finding other forms of livelihood) in addition to immaterial costs such those as stemming from the uprooting of individuals, households, and sometimes even communities. In some cases, those left behind, whether at the level of the household or the community may be precluded from reaping the benefits from migration, especially when remittances are hampered by the high cost of remitting or by the fact that migrants have a hard time finding jobs.

At the same time policy responses and development interventions need to recognize that migration represents a viable and legitimate mechanism through which people can address risks to their livelihoods and wider well-being, and a means of adapting to climate change and its impacts. A key question for migration policy is therefore where migration should be treated as a risk to be managed and mitigated, and where it should be treated as an opportunity to be facilitated or even encouraged. Enabling communities in sending areas to better leverage the potential benefits of migration and increase their adaptive capacity is often a better alternative than their progressive displacement. The effective economic insertion of migrants in urban areas leads to opportunities for the sending communities, particularly thanks to the transfer of remittances. For example, the evidence from the surveys and the qualitative work suggests a positive impact of remittances in areas affected by climate shocks, especially in terms of human development outcomes. Without a facilitating environment though, remittances are too often turned into pure consumption and the accumulation of non-productive assets. This type of assets can be of little value

both in terms of preventive and ex-post adaptation, as their investment contribution is limited and they are not liquid enough to be used when climate impacts strike, at which point their value can drop. Policy should focus on leveraging the impacts of remittances by encouraging their productive use, for instance by subsidizing forms of de-fiscalization for remittances-funded investments and community saving schemes which also facilitate financial integration and increase liquidity.

Fourth, urban development policy is a fundamental component of the policy package to address climate induced migration. Most of the study focuses on sending areas, but the qualitative work conducted in urban areas suggests that the integration of migrants into major destination cities is not working as well as it should. The study shows that climate induced migration tends to be towards cities, mostly large ones. The policy responses to climate shocks and migration are therefore to be found in cities as much as in sending areas. Concerns about employment and housing abound among migrants, with migration simply adding to existing pressures that can be dealt with only through broad-based economic development not necessarily focused on migration per se. The climate induced migration problem should be part of a broader policy debate about urbanization. Most MENA countries are rapidly urbanizing. While the share of the urban population in the region was at 48 per cent in 1980, it almost reached 60 per cent in 2000 and is expected to reach 70 per cent by 2015. The way MENA policymakers will address the challenges posed by climate induced migration is related to how they will manage to promote an urbanization model that welcomes the contribution of migrants to the development of cities.

Fifth, policy should focus on providing migrants with the portable skills and capabilities they need to fully exploit the adaptation potential of migration. All too often the policy debate focuses on whether migration should be encouraged or not. The study has shown that climate-induced migration is already taking place. It must therefore be accompanied. The provision of education and training can help potential migrants better grasp labour market opportunities both in sending and receiving areas, adapt to new living conditions, and shift more easily among jobs in different sectors. An emphasis on basic and portable skills would be effective regardless of the causes, timing, and destination of the migration decisions involved. And it would benefit not only those that leave, but also those that decide to stay or eventually return.

Sixth, while dealing with climate induced migration will require some interventions specifically aimed at migrants, the policy package needed to deal with both climate change and migration is much broader. This is both a challenge and an opportunity. This is an opportunity because several levers can be applied to

better leverage migration's potential for adaptation and development. But this is also a challenge because an integrated policy response will require a level of coordination and commitment that is likely to arise only through broader governance reforms and strong political leadership in MENA countries.

Finally, it is worth investigating how safeguards could play a role in reducing the risk that development initiatives result in negative impacts. For example, could inadvertent increases in the vulnerability of certain groups take place as a by-product of policies and projects that may or may not address climate change directly, such as adaptation initiatives involving resettlement and relocation? Is there a risk of maladaptation associated with interventions that are founded on unjustified assumptions about future climatic conditions and may thereby increase dependence or pressure on resources threatened by climate change? How to design safeguard mechanisms is a complex issue, if only because policy responses related to migration differ depending on whether one considers sudden-onset climate-related disasters or long-term climate-related environmental changes. But the fact that such safeguard mechanisms are needed is not itself in question.

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North–South migration: A different look at the migration and development debate

Frank Laczko and Tara Brian¹

Typically the debate about migration and its impact on development focuses on South–North migration, and the movement of people from poorer to richer countries. There has also been a growing recognition that South–South migration between developing countries is of increasing importance. But not much attention is given to North–South migration, despite numerous recent media reports suggesting that a growing number of people in richer countries in the ‘North’ are moving to developing countries in the ‘South’ in search of work. This article takes a closer look at recent trends in North–South migration and discusses some of the likely implications for development in countries of origin and destination.

Context

Policy dialogue on migration and development is intensifying, particularly in view of the second United Nations High Level Dialogue (HLD) to be held in New York in October 2013. The HLD 2013 takes place at an important time. As the 2015 deadline for realizing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approaches, the UN has embarked on a process to establish global support for a new global development framework. Migration was not integrated into the MDG framework in 2000, but many new reports on migration and development argue that it should be included in the post-2015 framework (see for example, the 2013 European Report on Development). As part of its input to the HLD, the European Commission published in May 2013 its Communication on Migration and Development – entitled *Maximizing the Development Impact of Migration*, which will now be discussed by other EU bodies to finalize the EU common position at the HLD, with conclusions to be adopted by the Council this June. The new EU Communication makes a strong case for a “more ambitious approach to migration and development,” and argues that migration must be recognized as an “enabling factor in the post-2015 development framework.”

Surprisingly, however, the new EC report makes virtually no reference to the growing number of migrants moving from Europe to developing countries. Although the

growing significance of South–South migration is noted, there is little discussion in the Communication on why people are leaving Europe and the impact of such migration on developing countries and Europe.

Definitional issues

It is difficult to arrive at precise estimates of the number of people migrating from the global ‘North’ to the global ‘South’ as definitions of ‘North’ and ‘South’ can vary. To date, there is no agreement on how best to categorize countries into South and North. The three most commonly used methods have been developed by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the World Bank (WB), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Bakewell, 2009).

For the UN DESA, the North does not include OECD countries such as Chile, Israel, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, and Turkey, or high-income non-OECD countries such as Bahrain; Hong Kong, China and the United Arab Emirates. Instead, several countries in Eastern Europe (such as Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) are considered part of the North.

The World Bank (WB) classifies countries every year according to their income level – their gross national income (GNI) per capita. Eastern Europe is largely considered South, while high-income countries – including, inter alia, those in the Gulf and special administrative regions of China, Macao and Hong Kong – are classified as North. The UNDP classifies countries as North or South according to the Human Development Index. While similar to the WB, this method includes fewer countries in the North, largely due to the fact that it leaves out many small (island) states.

North–South migration: Global trends

Depending on the definition used, the scale of North–South migration varies from 3 per cent of all migrants – using the World Bank and UNDP definitions, to 6 per cent using the UN DESA definition. This means that between 7 and 13 million migrants from the North were living in the South in 2010. By comparison, more than 40 per cent of all migrants were counted as ‘South–North’ migrants in 2010 (UN DESA, 2012). Given the paucity of data on migration in the South, and the fact

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that most countries keep better records of immigration than emigration trends, the full scale of North–South migration is likely to be under-recorded. Global averages based on census data also do not fully reflect the recent growth in North–South migration witnessed in some parts of the world.

Examples of recent trends in North–South migration include:

In **Angola**, the booming economy has made it a magnet for an increasing number of migrants. In 2009, 23,787 people arrived from Portugal (Emigration Observatory (a)). However, estimates of migration from Portugal vary. Portugal’s National Statistics Institute reports 23,760 emigrants to *all destinations* in 2010, up 41 per cent from 2009 (based on census data) (INE Portugal, 2012).

In **Brazil**, immigration has increased by 87 per cent from a decade before (IBGE, 2012).² The main source countries are the United States, Japan, Paraguay, and Portugal (ibid). Work permits granted to foreigners in Brazil in 2012 were up 70 per cent since 2009 (73,022 in 2012). The largest recipients were nationals of the United States, the Philippines, Haiti and the United Kingdom (MTE, 2013).

In **China**, the stocks of foreigners rose by 35 per cent in the last decade (593,832 in mainland China in 2010); 43.5 per cent were from South Korea, the United States or Japan (National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). The number of foreign students has also increased in recent years (328,330 in 2012), with most coming from South Korea, Japan and the United States (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). There are also increasing shares from Africa and Europe, while the share of students from Asia has remained stable in recent years. A growing number of Chinese who study abroad are returning (OECD, 2012:181). A report on the return behaviour of Chinese business students studying in France showed that economic opportunities in China were the primary reason to return (Shen, 2008). Another motivator was family ties and responsibilities, particularly felt by the large number of single children (ibid).

In **Mozambique**, there was a stock of 9,224 Portugal-born registered at consulates in 2012, up nearly 50 per cent from 6,211 in 2008 (Emigration Observatory

(b)). Numbers were much greater for foreign-born Portuguese, with over 20,000 registered with Portuguese consulates in Mozambique in 2012. However, emigration of foreign-born Portuguese has grown at a slower pace than Portugal-born (the former up 24% since 2008) (ibid.). The media report greater numbers, suggesting that 20,000 Portuguese are in Maputo alone (England, 2011).


In Europe at least 2.3 million emigrants were reported to have left the EU-27 Member States in 2011 (to all destinations, including within the EU) (Eurostat, 2013). The highest countries of emigration in Europe in 2011 were Spain (507,742), the United Kingdom (350,703), Germany (249,045) and France (213,367). The highest rates of emigration in 2011 were reported for Ireland (19 emigrants per 1,000 persons) and Lithuania (18 emigrants per 1,000 persons) (ibid.). However, there are also new emigration flows from EU-27 into Latin America and the Caribbean, especially Argentina and Brazil. In 2008 and 2009, over 107,000 European citizens migrated to a Latin American or Caribbean country (Córdova, 2012). The main source countries were Spain, Germany, Netherlands and Italy. Migration of Spain-born from Spain to Ecuador increased by 131 per cent between 2009 and 2010 (ibid.). Migration from Europe to Africa is also increasing. Emigrants from Spain to Africa reached 83,891 in 2011, up from just over 6,000 in 2009 (Eurostat, n.d.). Migration from Ireland to Nigeria grew by over 162 per cent between 2008 and 2010, and to South Africa by 173 per cent (ibid.).

Who are the North–South migrants and what motivates them to move?

Many North–South migrants are, in fact, migrants from the South who are returning to their home countries, in many cases because of the recession and lack of jobs in the North. In Spain, for example, in 2011, by far the majority of emigrants were foreign-born. Only 62,000 of the 500,000 emigrants from Spain in that year were born in Spain (INE Spain, 2012). The top three destinations for emigrants from Spain in 2011 were Morocco, Romania and Ecuador – all important source countries for immigrants to Spain (see Figure 1 below). As migrants are often the first to lose their jobs during an economic crisis, it is perhaps not surprising that they account for a large share of returnees. In Spain, for example, the unemployment rate for foreigners was 36 per cent at the end of 2012. Data on Brazil also show a high share of returns, with figures suggesting that over two-thirds of migrants who moved to the country from the North between 2005 and 2010 were returnees (IBGE, 2012). Brazil-born individuals represented 89 per cent of those from Japan, 84 per cent of immigrants from the United States, and 77 per cent of those arriving from Portugal (ibid).

² Data on migrants in the country refer to individuals living in Brazil on the reference date of the 2010 Census, who had been living in a foreign country five years before. Therefore, this figure includes return migrants born in Brazil (In 2010, 65% were returning Brazilians), naturalized Brazilians, and foreigners. This figure does not capture foreign-born who have been living in Brazil for longer than the five year census period.

Figure 1: Top destinations of emigrants from Spain, 2011



Source : National Statistics Institute (Spain) (INE).

More recently, however, there are signs that emigration of the Spanish-born has accelerated. In 2011, Spain-born emigrants rose by 58 per cent from the previous year, while foreign born emigrants from Spain rose by just 22.5 per cent in the same period (INE Spain, 2012). Estimates from the Spanish national statistical office based on municipal censuses, suggest that 40,625 Spanish-born emigrated between January and the end of June 2012, compared with 28,162 in the previous year (Huff Post, 2012). Data show a significant increase in the number of Spanish-born migrating to Morocco. The number of Spaniards resident in Morocco quadrupled between 2003 and 2011, according to the National Statistics Institute of Spain (Hustad, 2013).

Many of those who emigrate move to another EU country. Germany has been one of the destinations for these migrants, attracting more and more migrants from countries with high unemployment rates. Comparing the first three-quarters of 2012 with the same period of 2011, it can be seen that inflows of migrants from EU-10 countries to Germany rose by 38 per cent from Italy, by 48 per cent from Spain, by 49 per cent from Portugal and by 64 per cent from Greece (OECD, 2013).

There is also evidence showing that a rising number of Europeans are emigrating from Europe. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of native Spaniards emigrating to Chile rose by 144 per cent, to Mexico by 129 per cent, to Venezuela by 114 per cent, and to Brazil – the biggest economy in Latin America – by 227 per cent (Stargardter and Day, 2012). Estimates by Statistics Portugal indicate that approximately 44,000 people left Portugal in 2011, compared with 23,000 in 2010. Among these, there

was a sharp increase in emigrants going to non-EU destinations, up from 4,300 in 2010 to 15,500 in 2011 (OECD, 2013).

High unemployment among young people in European countries is also having an impact on emigration rates. But not all North–South migration is linked to economic factors and the recession.

Other reasons for North–South migration include globalization and the spread of companies in the North to the South. According to the 2012 *Global Mobility Survey Report*, 47 per cent of organizations reported growth in international assignments in the last year, fuelled in part by explosive expansion into emerging markets, particularly China (Brazier, 2012). A growing number of students are choosing to pursue education abroad – and increasingly they are opting to do so outside of traditional destination countries (OECD, 2010). New countries in the South that have emerged as popular destinations for international students include China, Malaysia, and South Africa (UNESCO, 2012).

Retirement migration is also a factor contributing to increases in North–South migration. Examples of retirement migration to the South include:

- US-born residents aged 55 and over increased substantially in Mexico and Panama between 1990 and 2000, rising by 17 per cent in Mexico and 136 per cent in Panama (Dixon et.al, 2006).
- New destinations for Europeans include Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, although flows remain

much smaller than to traditional destinations in the Mediterranean and other areas of Southern Europe (Balkir and Kirkulak, 2009);

- Other flows in Europe often follow along colonial ties, for instance British nationals moving to South Africa,³
- In Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have emerged in the last two decades as retirement locations, for example for the aging Japanese population (Toyota, 2007; and Ono, 2008).

Although data are lacking, it is likely that there is also an increase in medical migration (namely, nationals seeking less expensive care across international borders).

Some implications for development

Few studies have yet to investigate the impact of recent trends in North–South migration for development. Given the trends outlined above, it should be expected that the implications of North–South migration for development are largely linked to the impact of return migration on countries in the South. On the positive side, migrants could bring back skills and knowledge acquired abroad. On the negative side, return migration could be associated with unemployment and a loss of remittances.

North

The North is also impacted by emigration to the South. For one, Europeans moving to developing countries are remitting more to Europe.

Some recent examples of remittance flows to the North have been provided by Stratfor (2013), showing the following trends:

- Portuguese citizens living abroad sent EUR 2.45 billion in 2012, up from EUR 2.42 in 2010;
- Spain received EUR 5.9 billion in 2012, up 3.6 per cent from 2011;
- Irish living abroad sent EUR 570 million home in 2012, up nearly 27 per cent since 2007.

However, remittances still account for only a small share of GDP in the North; for example, less than 1 per cent of GDP in Spain and Ireland, and around 2 per cent in Portugal (Stratfor, 2013).

Obviously North–South migration could relieve pressure on labour markets in the North as young people without

jobs seek work in the South. But there could also be negative implications, such as:

- A loss of skilled young people in sending countries;
- A reduction in the tax base;
- Effects on the demographic ratios, both through higher emigration and decreased immigration.

South

In terms of the possible implications for development in the South, gains could include: human and financial capital, skills transfer and ‘reverse brain drain’, enhanced networks between North and South, growth of the service industry, new investments and an increasing number of foreign visitors.

The possible negatives could include: increases in real estate prices and greater strains on health and social services (through retirement migration), competition with local labour, return of less-skilled migrants who could put a strain on over-burdened labour markets, and a reduction in remittances for households accustomed to receiving financial flows from abroad.⁴ In Spain, for example, the outflow of remittances from foreigners residing in Spain fell from 8.4 billion euros in 2006 to 6.4 billion euros in 2012 (Stratfor, 2013).

These sorts of impacts have neither been the subject of much research nor policy discussion to date, but the examples given above indicate that North–South migration could have a wide range of implications for development.

Conclusion

A rising number of people in the North have decided to move to the South, either to seek work, study, retire, or return home. North–South migration affects millions of people every year and should be factored into discussions about the implications of migration for development.

Contrary to the impression given in many media reports, a great deal of North–South migration is due to return migration. North–South migration seems to be increasing, although there is still insufficient research and data on this trend and its effects. Emigration from the North of those born in the North has increased

³ For more information on retirement migration from the United Kingdom, see P. Mawhinney and O. Khan (2011), *To Stay or Not to Stay: Retirement Migration Decisions among Older People*. Runnymede, London.

⁴ For a study on the integration of returning South Asian migrants from Gulf countries, see UN DESA V. Abraham and I.S. Rajan (2011), *Global Financial Crisis and Return of South Asian Gulf Migrants*; for impacts of retirement migration, see Dixon et al., (2006), *America's Emigrants: US Retirement Migration to Mexico and Panama*.

significantly, although the bulk of these emigrants move to another country in the North.

Beyond the numbers, North–South migration reminds us that most countries of the world are both countries of origin and destination. Rising North–South migration could help to change the terms of the migration and development debate. Too often this debate can become polarized around questions relating to rights and access to labour markets for migrants in the South seeking work in the North. With many countries in the South now actively recruiting workers from the North, countries are more likely to come together to discuss shared concerns and issues.

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Migration as a development enabler: Putting enablers into practice in the Post-2015 Development Agenda

Chris Richter¹

Introduction

In its foundational report *Realizing the Future We Want for All*, the United Nations Task Team (UNTT) on the Post-2015 Development Agenda² lays out its vision for a new framework to pursue poverty eradication and achieve sustainable development once the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) expire in 2015. A key aspect of the proposed framework is the inclusion of a core set of 'development enablers', which are intended to support progress towards four key dimensions of development – inclusive economic development, inclusive social development, environmental sustainability and peace and security.³ Migration, and specifically fair rules to manage migration, is highlighted as one of these enablers.

While the meaning of the term 'development enabler' might seem somewhat self-evident, in practical terms it is much less clear how these development enablers can be integrated into the post-2015 agenda, raising a number of important questions. How does migration act as an enabler of development? How can the concept of a development enabler be operationalized? How does it relate to a possible set of development goals, targets and indicators? For migration and development practitioners, the challenge is therefore to clearly define and operationalize migration as an enabler of development and to articulate how it should best be incorporated into the post-2015 framework.

Fortunately, the international development discourse contains a number of useful ideas to help frame the enabler concept in a practical sense, and to situate migration squarely as a key element of the new development agenda. This paper discusses some of these issues by considering how the development enabler concept has been addressed in the post-2015 discourse, how migration is considered an enabler for

development, and how it might be operationalized in the post-2015 development agenda.

Defining development 'enablers'

At its simplest, the concept of a development enabler is about recognizing and responding to the systemic issues and global trends that can influence, positively or negatively, sustainable development. It is about ensuring that the effect of those factors produces positive, rather than negative outcomes and that the barriers to development are reduced, if not completely eliminated. Within development discourse for example, the need to manage the interdependence of today's globalized world, and to take account of the impacts of globalization in order to make it a positive force for development has been central. This notion has been expressed, explicitly or implicitly, in numerous contributions to the development literature, which is littered with references to globalization and the need to manage its consequences.

One of the clearest examples of this can be found in the document that formed the basis of the MDG framework we have today – the Millennium Declaration. Adopted in the year 2000, the Millennium Declaration is the key document outlining the values and principles on which the MDGs are now based. It recognized that globalization presents both challenges and opportunities for the international community, and that the central challenge is therefore to ensure that it becomes a positive force for all the world's people.⁴ Part of the approach for doing so called for creating an environment – both at the national and global levels – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty.⁵ In other words, the Declaration called for an enabling environment which would allow progress to be made towards development and which would ease some of the systemic issues that can hinder positive progress.

More recently, the global discussions on the post-2015 development agenda have focused on the fact that globalization presents both challenges and opportunities, and that managing its impacts is vital to ensuring sustainable progress towards development.

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² The UNTT was established by the Secretary-General in January 2012 to coordinate the UN system's preparations for and inputs to the post-2015 development agenda, and to propose a collective vision for the new agenda. It is comprised of some 60 United Nations agencies and related entities, including IOM.

³ United Nations (2012), *Realizing the Future We Want for All* Report to the Secretary-General, New York.

⁴ United Nations (2000), United Nations Millennium Declaration Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/55/L.2.

⁵ Ibid.

In *Realizing the Future We Want for All*, the UNTT emphasized that, because of the highly interdependent and interconnected world, changed modern context, and the new actors and challenges emerging within the international setting, a holistic, global approach is required.⁶ Importantly, the on-going debate has highlighted migration, alongside other demographic trends such as population growth, ageing, ‘youth bulges’ and urbanization, as being amongst the important global trends, challenges and opportunities that must be taken into account in order to make the new development agenda effective.

Framing migration as a development enabler

Migration fits well within a concept of development enablers that focuses on managing the implications of globalization and increased connectivity. It is itself a truly globalized phenomenon that can impact, both positively and negatively, progress towards sustainable development and to any internationally agreed set of development goals. Indeed, migration has increased in both scale and complexity and has significant implications for on-going development efforts. It will place increasing pressure on societies to manage the implications of that mass human mobility on development.

Details about the scale of migration are well known – roughly one out of every seven people on the planet today is on the move, including some 215 million international migrants and 740 million internal migrants.⁷ While the proportion of the world’s population that migrate overseas – around 3% – has remained relatively stable over the past two decades, the absolute numbers of people moving has increased and there are more people on the move today than at any point in history.⁸ By its sheer scale alone, migration has become a defining megatrend of the 21st Century, and it touches many lives, whether individually or collectively.

Furthermore, migration is becoming an increasingly complex phenomenon, with migratory patterns evolving in ways that create new challenges for migrants and for origin and destination countries alike. Movements involving the permanent settlement of people who have

migrated from one place to another are giving way to greater circularity; people move back and forth between countries with increased regularity, and in some cases to multiple destinations.⁹ The composition of migrant populations is also evolving in new ways. Migrants today come from a wider range of countries and backgrounds than ever before, while significantly more women are migrating alone or as the head of households.¹⁰ These trends have particular relevance to host communities, which experience the effects of migration in terms of changes to social structures, identities, attitudes, norms and practices.¹¹

The increased scale and complexity of migration creates crucial justifications for migration being incorporated into the Post-2015 Development Agenda and associated sustainable development goals. For instance, goals related to urbanization or to disaster risk reduction would be incomplete without taking into account the implications of rural to urban migration. Policies on financing for sustainable development may miss out on new and innovative forms of funding if they do not consider the scale and impact of migrant remittances. Efforts to reduce inequality and to promote human rights would be insufficient if they did not address migrants’ experience of discrimination and exploitation. Mechanisms dealing with labour market gaps and skills shortages would not benefit from the full array of options available without considering skilled and unskilled labour mobility. Strategies relating to climate change and the environment would be inadequate if they did not consider migration, both as a driver and a result of climate and environmental pressures.

Quite aside from the implications migration presents as a global megatrend however, the individual act of migrating can offer substantial social and economic benefits to migrants, and to countries of origin and destination. For example, the 2009 *Human Development Report* found that migrants who moved from a country with a low human development index (HDI) to a higher HDI country experienced, on average, a 15-fold increase in income; a doubling in education enrolment rates; and a 16-fold reduction in child mortality.¹² Migrant remittances meanwhile – which are estimated to have

⁶ United Nations (2012), *Realizing the Future We Want for All* Report to the Secretary-General, New York.

⁷ International Organization for Migration (2010), *The Future of Migration: Building Capacities to Change*, World Migration Report 2010, Geneva; International Organization for Migration 2013, Facts & Figures. Available from www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/facts-figures-1.html; UNDP (2009), *Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, Human Development Report, New York.

⁸ International Organization for Migration (2010), ‘The Future of Migration: Building Capacities to Change’, *World Migration Report 2010*, Geneva; International Organization for Migration (2013), Facts & Figures, www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-migration/facts-figures-1.html, Geneva.

⁹ S. Rosengartner and L. Lonnback (2013), ‘Making the Case for Including Migration into the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda’, Background paper for the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda – Expert Policy Dialogue on Migration, Stockholm, 26 February 2013.

¹⁰ International Organization for Migration (2010), *The Future of Migration: Building Capacities to Change*, World Migration Report 2010, Geneva.

¹¹ International Organization for Migration (2011), ‘Migration and Social Change’, International Dialogue on Migration, Number 17, Geneva.

¹² UNDP (2009), *Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, Human Development Report, New York.

reached some USD 401 billion in 2012¹³ – contribute to poverty reduction; higher human capital accumulation; spending on health and education; greater access to information and communication technologies; improved financial sector access, small business investment, job creation and entrepreneurship; and greater household resilience to natural disasters or economic shocks.¹⁴

Further, what happens to migrants in terms of health, education, employment, social protection and peace and security is of fundamental importance, not just to the social and economic development of the societies in which they live, but also to their own human development. Migrants who are free from discrimination or exploitation, who have full access to health and education and who are able to participate in decent employment can better contribute to the social and economic development of nations. Above all they lead full and productive lives, which is surely the overall goal of human development.

Incorporating migration into the Post-2015 Development Agenda

However, while migration offers potentially huge gains for migrants, and for origin and destination countries alike, it also presents a number of challenges and can be associated with new inequalities and vulnerabilities, especially when it is poorly governed or occurs under conditions of insecurity. The gains that can be derived from migration are therefore not automatic, and its potentially positive impacts on development hinge upon appropriate policies to govern migration in a humane and orderly way and on the protection of the human rights and well-being of all migrants.

This last point is a particularly important issue to take account of when conceptualizing how migration fits within the broad development agenda. It provides some clues as to how the development enabler potential of migration can be operationalized: we know that migration has important links to sustainable development and can create hugely positive benefits. We also know that the extent to which migration creates positive outcomes depends on the migration process itself being safe, humane and orderly. It is also dependent on the extent to which migrant rights are protected and promoted.

¹³ World Bank (2012), *Migration and Development Brief*, number 19, November 2012, Washington D.C.

¹⁴ D. Ratha, S. Mohapatra and E. Scheja (2011), 'Impact of migration on economic and social development', *Migration Policy Practice*, volume 1, number 1, October-November 2011; S. Rosengartner and L. Lonnback (2013), 'Making the Case for Including Migration into the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda', Background paper for the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda – Expert Policy Dialogue on Migration, Stockholm, 26 February 2013.

Finally, we know that, being a globalized phenomenon of such huge scale, migration cannot be managed by countries acting in isolation.

These four points lead quite logically to a set of mutually reinforcing (and at times overlapping) policies:

1. Policies to ensure that migration is safe, humane and orderly, such as simpler and freer migration programmes and entry requirements; mechanisms to protect migrants during times of crisis or as a result of environmental disasters; or strategies to combat people trafficking and smuggling.
2. Policies to maximize the positive benefits of migration, such as to support the flow of remittances and their productive use; to encourage and manage circular migration; and to enhance portability of rights.
3. Policies to promote and protect migrant rights, including to protect and enforce labour rights; to promote non-discrimination against migrants; and to provide greater access to social services and social safety nets.
4. Global partnerships to operationalize options 1), 2) and 3) and to manage the global implications of migration, such as through labour mobility agreements; fair recruitment practices; and commitment to and development of international migration norms and standards.

In turn, these policy options can be linked to a set of corresponding goals, targets and indicators that might be incorporated into the Post-2015 Development Agenda so that the enabler potential of migration can be realized. Four particular options are evident, each with their own strengths and weaknesses:

1. Separately highlight migration and other development enablers through a statement agreed by world leaders,¹⁵ much like the *Millennium Declaration* provided a basis for the MDG framework. Such an approach would give recognition to these issues as important factors to take into account, but may lead to them being marginalized once the framework is instituted and efforts to meet its objectives begin in earnest, particularly if not supported by tangible goals.
2. A standalone goal related to migration, which, like the first option, would elevate migration as an important enabler of development. However, a combination of many factors – including social and economic realities, the cross-cutting nature of migration as

¹⁵ P. Lucci and P. Martins (2013), *Post-2015: Can we talk about migration?*, Overseas Development Institute, London.

well as political sensitivities – may make it unlikely that a stand-alone goal would be either achievable or desirable.

3. A cross-cutting issue under other development goals (for example inserted as a target or indicator under goals on health, education, or human rights) focusing on policies that enhance the benefits of migration to these different thematic areas. This would nicely reflect the cross-cutting, enabler potential of migration, closely linking it to the key areas in which it has greatest development impact. Targets or indicators focusing on migrant protection would also be an essential aspect of this approach.
4. A possible element of a renewed global partnership for development, building on the current MDG8 “Develop a Global Partnership for Development”. This would be an important means of operationalizing the enabler potential of migration, being a mechanism to address its cross-border implications and broader systemic barriers through bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. It could include measures to reduce the costs of migration and of remittance transfers, facilitate circular labour mobility, or promote portability of benefits and recognition of migrants’ educational qualifications.

Conclusion

The development enabler concept has taken on particular salience in the context of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The need to manage the increasingly globalized challenges facing humanity and to create an enabling environment in which to pursue more sustainable development has been central. What has been less clear in the global discourse is how the enabler concept can be operationalized in practice, and how development enablers like migration can be incorporated into the Post-2015 Development Agenda. This paper offers a practical way of thinking about these issues and highlights a number of ways that migration can be integrated. The most important point to note is that while migration offers tremendous opportunities to development, the extent to which it does so is contingent on the migration process itself being safe, humane and orderly. Effective policies are therefore important to assisting migration achieve its potential for development, and incorporating migration into the Post-2015 Development Agenda is an essential part of that.

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